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Los Zetas, Neoliberalism, and Popular Opposition: A Study in Linkages 
Gina Renee Lyle 
 
Los Zetas are considered by security analysts to be a transformative force within 
transnational criminal organizations (TCO), exporting their unique model 
throughout Mexico. Los Zetas’ idiosyncratic interventions include their 
diversification of criminal operations, professionalization of TCO security, 
sophisticated use of media and technology, extreme forms of violent coercion, 
and decentralized command structure. This project aims to complicate the 
narrative that Los Zetas emerged because of top leaders’ sadistic tendencies or 
due to an inherently violent culture in Mexico by reframing the group’s evolution 
within historical processes. Moving beyond Los Zetas, this project examines how 
persons affected by Los Zetas’ indiscriminate use of violence are forces of 
activism and social change, connecting opposition culture in Mexico to criminal 
impunity and resistance movements in Guerrero. Examining Los Zetas in 
connection with Cold War militarization in Latin America, processes of 
democratization in Mexico, and the neoliberal order, this analysis views Los 
Zetas as products and agents of structural inequities, destroying spaces of 
community cohesion to create spaces of elite economic growth.   
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In 2011, the international hacktivist group Anonymous, an online collective known 
for infiltrating and attacking corporate and government entities, took on the transnational 
criminal organization (TCO) Los Zetas after a member of Anonymous was reportedly 
kidnapped by the organization. In response to the abduction, which occurred in 
Veracruz, Mexico, on October 6, 2011, Anonymous posted a video threatening to 
expose the identities of Los Zetas and their collaborators, including public officials and 
taxi drivers. The hacktivists directed Los Zetas to either release their prisoner by 
November 5 or risk having the names and addresses of their “servants,” many of whom 
worked as municipal police, posted to the internet for all to see.1  
Los Zetas transformed the model of TCOs in Mexico, and while the conflict with 
Anonymous was just a small bump in the road for the group, it nevertheless illustrates 
the uniqueness of their model, and how they utilized irregular forms of warfare, including 
the media, in distinctive and forward-thinking ways. For Anonymous, the internet was a 
space to promote accessibility and the liberation of information. For Los Zetas, 
cyberspace was a domain integral to operational expansion as well as a space through 
which the group could enforce zones of silence.2 The Anonymous clash occurred at the 
height of Los Zetas’ corrosive power and was sandwiched in between two abhorrent 
massacres in Tamaulipas. The interaction, in addition to showcasing Los Zetas’ 
 
1 Associated Press, “Anonymous Hackers Threaten Mexican Drug Cartel,” Guardian, Oct. 31, 
2011, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/31/anonymous-
hackers-mexican-drug-cartel. 
2 Paul Rexton Kan, “Cyberwar in the Underworld:  Anonymous vs. Los Zetas in Mexico,” Yale 
Journal of International Affairs (Winter 2013). 
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technological sophistication, signifies the growing opposition to Zeta authority from a 
variety of actors. The opposition came at a moment when Los Zetas seemed to be 
basking in the glow of growth and power, indeed at a moment they had 
comprehensively penetrated state and social systems in their zones of operation. 
In the Anonymous video, the group defiantly contended, “Veracruz, Mexico and the 
world is tired of the criminal group the Zetas, which is dedicated to kidnapping, stealing, 
and extortion.” Anonymous then went on to declare, “You have made a great mistake by 
taking one of us. Free him,” by Friday, November 5, or there will be consequences. “We 
cannot defend ourselves with weapons, but we know who they are. Information is free. 
We do not forgive. We do not forget.”3  
Anonymous did not move forward with exposing the members and collaborators 
of Los Zetas and eventually withdrew their threat from the public sphere. The hacktivists 
are a decentralized group without a cohesive mandate or system of defense and their 
withdrawal from the conflict may be attributed to the fact that Stratfor, a security 
company, warned Anonymous that Los Zetas had hired cybersecurity professionals to 
track their operatives.4 Paul Rexton Kan argues the “release of this information on the 
internet would have exposed members of Los Zetas to not only possible arrest by 
Mexican authorities, but also to assassination by rival cartels.”5 The retreat by both 
Anonymous and Los Zetas may have therefore come from fears of mutually assured 
destruction. There were also reports that the kidnapped Anonymous member had been 
 
3 AP, “Anonymous Hackers Threaten.” 
4 Charles Arthur, “Anonymous Retreats from Mexico Drug Cartel Confrontation,” Guardian, 
November 2, 2011, accessed January 15, 2021, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/nov/02/anonymous-zetas-hacking-climbdown. 
5 Kan, “Cyberwar in the Underworld.” 
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quietly released on November 4, one day before the deadline.6 Despite the fact that the 
specifics of the conflict are vague and difficult to verify, a challenge to the research of 
TCOs more broadly and this thesis more specifically, the dispute continues to illustrate 
how evolving landscapes of irregular warfare, expanding modes of coercion, the unique 
use of technology, and a modern organizational structure resulted in a transformation, 
revolutionizing criminal organizations throughout Mexico. 
1.1 Los Zetas: TCO Disruptors 
Los Zetas began in the state of Tamaulipas, Mexico, in the 1990s, originally 
serving as the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel (CDG). The enforcer wing was formed from 
Mexican army deserters who were members of elite military units and trained in 
counterinsurgency methods. Through their professionalization of violence, 
diversification of operations, indiscriminate methods of coercion, use of technology, and 
horizontal command structure,7 the organization represents a clear paradigm shift within 
TCO modeling, disrupting traditional hierarchies and modes of structure. As trained 
members of the military, the group used military culture, discipline, and weaponry skills 
to maintain a strong power base. The group’s flamboyant methods of violence became 
a potent source of coercion, allowing for widespread extortion in their regions of 
operation. In response to Los Zetas’ methods and organizational structure, other TCOs 
in Mexico created their own enforcer wings. For instance, groups including Barrio 
Azteca, Los Negros, and Gente Nueva replicated the model of Los Zetas by 
professionalizing their enforcement units.8 Los Zetas’ rapid growth, infiltration of 
 
6 Adam Clark Estes, “Anonymous and Los Zetas Cartel Declare a Truce,” Atlantic, Nov. 4, 2011. 
7 Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017). 
8 Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas, 37. 
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Mexican society, and indiscriminate modes of violence challenged the state’s monopoly 
on violence and its control over the formation of social structures,9 assaulting the state’s 
“legitimate” right to exert authority and control over the population.  
What place do TCOs, and Los Zetas more specifically, have in academic 
discourse? Too often the limited scholarly analysis has relied upon civilizational rhetoric, 
framing modern against unmodern, barbaric against developed, essentializing TCOs 
within Latin America as inherently hyperviolent. The focus of scholars such as Zeta 
expert George Grayson has been the role of sadism as an instrument of warfare, as 
typified, for example, by the dissolution of their victims’ bodies in vats of acid.10 While 
extreme coercive strategies are certainly a part of Los Zetas’ interventions, the subtext 
of such rhetoric, without the inclusion of structural and socioeconomic causes, greatly 
obfuscates the complexity of their emergence and reinforces imperialistic constructs.  
Post-Cold War modes of violence, of which Los Zetas are included, are, 
according to anthropologist Kees Koonings, characterized by economic as opposed to 
ideological motivations.11 Koonings argues while old patterns of violence, occurring from 
1950-1980, were motivated by “social inequity, political exclusion, and 
authoritarianism,”12 new forms of violence are similarly motivated by social inequality 
and exclusion but are less overtly political. New forms of violence, for the purposes of 
this thesis, can be defined as a “democratization in the sense that a variety of social 
 
9 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965). 
10 George W. Grayson, The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America: Sadism as 
an Instrument of Cartel Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 
2014).  
11 Kees Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity, and the State: Reflections on Latin America and 
Mexico,” in Violence, Coercion, and State Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The Other Half 
of the Centaur, ed. Wil G. Pansters (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
12 Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity,” 255. 
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actors pursue a variety of objectives and coercive strategies.”13 These pursuits, while 
not directly related to ideological movements, are nevertheless connected to historical 
precedents and the social force of neoliberalism. 
The emergence of Los Zetas brings two primary questions to the forefront: what 
historical factors contributed to Los Zetas’ model, and are they a political organization? 
While there cannot be a rigid demarcation between ideological motivations and 
economic motivations (the interaction between the two exist within a porous space),14 
there has been a marked shift in the patterns of non-state actors. This pattern, in which 
the violence of leftist insurgents has been replaced by depoliticized TCOs, is connected 
to both weakened state systems and neoliberal economic policies. Such economic 
policies, which are also inherently social in nature, have contributed to widespread 
poverty and dehumanization in Latin America.  
Sociologist and journalist Dawn Paley argues the neoliberal revolution is 
differentiated from the Cold War because it occurs during an era of democratization and 
at a time when “neoliberalism is being consolidated as the hegemonic global model of 
economic and social governance.”15 The shift is also characterized by the intentional 
depoliticization of the conflicts to uphold the neoliberal mandate. In this system, 
confusion is central to maintaining order and control. This confusion is partly achieved 
by linking both perpetrators and victims of violence to criminal activity, thereby creating 
 
13 Koonings, “New Violence, Insecurity,” 258. 
14 Nigel Gould Davies’ examination of ideology and realism within the context of Cold War 
international relations in that the two constructs are not mutually exclusive but exist alongside 
one another can be applied to the examination of TCOs within Mexico. See Nigel Gould Davies, 
“Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War,” Journal of Cold 
War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 90-109. 
15 Dawn Marie Paley, “Cold War, Neoliberal War, and Disappearance: Observations from 
Mexico,” Latin American Perspectives 48, no.1 (January 2021): 152. 
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societal vertigo to prevent forms of solidarity. Finally, the revolution outsources its main 
actors, who use extreme coercive strategies, including the grotesque display of bodies 
and elevated methods of torture, to communicate terror and exact division.16 The 
depoliticization is a strategy, therefore, to obscure the inherent political nature of 
poverty, displacement, and terrorization. The siloed approach, in which there is a solid 
demarcation between Cold War conflicts and post-Cold War conflicts severs crucial 
aspects of the interaction. In truth there are connective precedents integral to the 
evolving forms of conflict in Latin America. This thesis expands upon scholars who 
implement a more holistic approach, including political scientist Guadalupe Correa-
Cabrera and Dawn Paley, by examining the fluidity of historical context, including 
democratization, militarization, and neoliberalism, to understand the evolution and 
impact of Los Zetas.  
1.2 The Modernity of Los Zetas 
Are Los Zetas exceptional, are they modern, and how have neoliberalism and 
state formation contributed to their emergence? In chapter 2, “Replications of 
Modernity,” I explore the socioeconomic conditions necessary for the emergence of Los 
Zetas, arguing their evolution is related to a weakening PRI and more fluid borders. The 
section will examine how the fragmentation from democratization has been utilized by 
the group and replicated in sophisticated ways. While idiosyncratic in their modeling and 
trajectory, Los Zetas are inextricably linked to the process of state formation and 
neoliberalism, filling vacuums of power with their unique organizational structure and 
methods of coercion. Using documents such as FBI assessments, consulate 
 
16 Paley, “Cold War, Neoliberal War,” 152. 
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communications, and DEA assessments, I will examine their professionalization of 
violence, their diversification of operations, their indiscriminate use of violence, and their 
horizontal command structure and compare it traditional TCOs, who utilized amateur 
security, used targeted violence, and a vertical command structure often connected to 
familial connections.17  
While the traditional TCO more closely resembles pre-modern or monarchical 
systems of power, relying on allegiances formed through traditional hierarchies, Los 
Zetas utilize democratic power structures and meritocratic mobility. Additionally, the 
organization’s utilization of technology, including their use of media and a proprietary 
radio network, further accentuates their replication of modernity. The replication of 
democratization viewed through the model of Los Zetas reinforces the argument that 
neoliberalism was a structural agent of capitalism and a force of social change, and 
while Los Zetas benefitted from new modes of warfare, including their use of social 
media to exert power, the public sphere likewise replicated the democratization of 
Mexico, wielding information as a weapon of agency.  
1.3 Impunity and Opposition 
Discourse surrounding the conflict with Los Zetas often frames the interaction 
through a unidirectional lens, positioning Los Zetas as the central agents of change. 
Chapter 3, “Impunity and Opposition,” reorients the framework to include resistance as 
a significant force of change that is rooted in both democratization and the Dirty War in 
Guerrero. This section is informed by the work of historian Pablo Piccato, who explores 
the relationship between crime, truth, and justice in Mexico. In a modern justice system, 
 
17 Correa-Cabrera, Los Zetas Inc., 59. 
 
 8 
a crime is committed, police investigate the crime to determine what occurred, and 
justice is carried out by the judiciary. In Mexico, Piccato argues crime has been defined 
by a disconnection between these three tenets, and this disconnection has led to both a 
tolerance for extrajudicial punishment and a robust public discourse surrounding 
criminality.18 The abolishment of the jury trial in 1929, for instance, ignited a crisis of 
transparency in which popular participation was extinguished, and the justice system 
assumed an opaque quality. After 1929, extrajudicial forms of justice expanded 
dramatically, and the press became a legitimate source of truth for the public.  
The press assumed a role outside the boundary of typical private enterprise and 
participated in police investigations as a legitimate partner in state action. In this zone of 
exclusion, the media is a space through which the public can search for truth and exact 
justice. Considering the state has normalized impunity, the media can therefore be 
viewed as the arm of the people, and a method through which popular agency 
challenges TCOs.  
During her discourse on the fragmentation of the police, Diane Davis argues the 
police were central to historical conflicts in Mexico, including the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution and the neoliberal transition of the nineties. Davis argues impunity is partly 
rooted in a 1917 constitutional reform that separated the judicial forces from the 
preventive forces. This resulted in a fragmentation of the police and led to challenges of 
accountability as well as threats to state legitimacy. To combat impunity during the 
Calderón administration, a more militaristic approach was applied to quell conflicts, and 
 
18 Pablo Piccato, A History of Infamy: Crime, Truth, and Justice in Mexico (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2017). 
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included the use of lie detector tests and coerced resignations among judicial police.19 
While this may have led to increased accountability from above, it was limiting in its 
accountability from below.  
Democratization can, like the formation of the criminal justice system, be viewed 
as integral to the evolution of activism and resistance in Mexico. This thesis explores 
how the democratic transition did not simply “happen” in 2000 but slowly progressed 
and is rooted in opposition groups who methodically undermined the authority of the 
PRI. This culture of dissent is also viewed through the uprising in Guerrero during the 
1960s and 1970s, in which violent state repression was countered by the work of rebel 
Lucio Cabañas. Both the process of democratization and the history of popular 
uprisings provide a window through which to view forms of opposition to Los Zetas. 
Additionally, Chapter 3 explores challenges to Zeta authority in media spaces as well as 
through the resistance of the 72 migrants who were kidnapped in Tamaulipas in 2010.  
Limitations to this examination include the inherent biases of journalistic and 
social media sources. Such biases, however, if examined through the lens through 
which the source was constructed, as well as in concert with academic literature, may 
prove valuable in revealing perspectives and modes of thinking. While Los Zetas utilized 
the tools of democratization to expand their model, the public likewise commandeered 
the democratizing space to challenge impunity, using transparency to exact justice. 
These acts can thus be viewed as crucial to the activism that ultimately contributed to 
the fragmentation and decline of Los Zetas.  
 
19 Diane Davis, “Policing and Regime Transition: From Post-Authoritarianism to Populism to   
Neoliberalism,” in Violence, Coercion, and State Making in Twentieth-Century Mexico: The 
Other Half of the Centaur, ed. Wil G. Pansters (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 84.  
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 1.4 Neoliberalism and Criminality 
What interaction exists between neoliberalism and criminality? The work of David 
Harvey provides a foundational framework through which to view neoliberalism more 
broadly. Harvey argues neoliberalism is a political project by the capitalist elite to 
mitigate the social and economic effects of revolutionary movements during the 1960s 
and 1970s and is used to curb the power of labor.20 Harvey contextualizes neoliberal 
policies historically, arguing postwar capitalism and its uneasy alliance with labor 
(brokered by a state who focused on social welfare and the individual wage) was no 
longer fostering economic growth. The era of stagnation resulted in a 1970s crisis of 
capital accumulation.21  
This thesis explores the construct of neoliberalism within the policies inspired by 
the “Washington Consensus,” in which there was a formula for “sustained economic 
growth and seamless national development,”22 and is characterized by “a 
comprehensive program of balanced budgets, reduced taxes, decontrolled interest 
rates, floating exchange rates, liberalized trade relations, open foreign investment, 
deregulation, and privatization.”23 Policy changes, such as NAFTA, resulted in an 
uneven distribution of wealth and increasing economic and social marginalization of the 
global South, with farmers and other non-corporate entities unable to compete with 
powerful transnational corporations. This thesis does not seek to categorically equate 
 
20 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
21 David Harvey, “Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 610, no. 1 (March 2007): 27. 
22 Douglas S. Massey, Magaly Sanchez R., and Jere R. Behrman, “Introduction: Of Myths and 
Markets,” in Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2006), Volume 606, 8.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 Massey, et al., “Myths and Markets,” 8. 
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neoliberalism with criminality, but to identify how structural changes that began in the 
1970s changed the nature of capitalism and became a social force in Mexico.24 The end 
result has been the internalization of neoliberal mandates and a restructuring of political 
and socioeconomic systems. 
Chapter 4 will examine the social force of neoliberalism in Tamaulipas to view 
how it displaced and divided the population. The social division as well as a weakened 
Mexican state also provided a space for TCOs to challenge state authority outside a 
Weberian construction of legitimacy. While a conspiracy between corporate elites and 
TCOs is not a contention of this thesis, there is a paradoxical alignment of interests in 
that instability in Mexico and weak state systems ultimately facilitates capital expansion 
and elite hegemony. In the state of Tamaulipas, for instance, the instability caused by 
Zeta violence opened a space for private capital to buy land and exploit the region so 
rich in resources. 
Porfirian liberalism, a period that was marked by an influx of American capital 
that undermined Mexican sovereignty, informs my analysis of Los Zetas and the 
neoliberal period. In Empire and Revolution, John Mason Hart examines the extensive 
involvement of American capitalists within the Mexican political sphere from the Civil 
War to the end of the twentieth century. The monograph uses detailed case studies of 
American industrialists and financiers, from their development of the Mexican railway 
system to their control of the Mexican insurance industry, to explore the deep 
interactions between the United States and Mexico. This monograph highlights 
connections between American capital and shifting political processes, including the 
 
24 David Adam Morton, “Structural Change and Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Third World Quarterly 
24, no. 4 (August 2003): 631-53. 
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Mexican Revolution and WWII.25 Hart details the astounding amount of capital that 
flowed into Mexico before the Revolution, including that of William Randolph Hearst, 
George T. Bliss, Percy Rockefeller, and J.P. Morgan, highlighting the concept of 
Mexican corruption as a justification for U.S. intervention.  
For instance, although Mexican President Lerdo (served as president from 1872 
to 1876) was open to privatization, he still feared American hegemony and did not want 
to be alienated from trade with Europe through a bilateral trade agreement. This was at 
a time when Mexican nationalists and campesinos opposed the hacienda system, 
raiding large plantations and demanding restoration of “usurped” lands.26 As a result, 
Lerdo canceled major contracts with American financiers, resulting in American 
intervention. To protect their financial interests, and with the support of the United 
States Government, U.S. elites armed General Diaz, helping him to depose the 
democratically elected Lerdo in 1876. This interaction highlights a pattern of behavior, 
illuminating the U.S. penchant for support of military regimes to uphold American 
financial interests in Latin America.  
With respect to the linkages between liberalism and neoliberalism, Hart argues 
Mexican interactions with the United States, including policies such as NAFTA, can 
serve as a framework through which to view American hegemony. Hart contends such 
interactions are critical to understanding “how the United States became a global 
empire, the impulses behind neoliberalism, the growth of American culture in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa, and the process of globalization.”27 Beyond globalization, 
 
25 John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americas in Mexico since the Civil War 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
26 Hart, Empire and Revolution, 56. 
27 Hart, Empire and Revolution, 2. 
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Hart explores the ongoing conflict between Mexican sovereignty and American 
hegemony, a dialectical struggle that continues to this day. This thesis will explore how 
economically motivated violence is connected to structural inequities and the period of 
democratization, which transformed entrenched hierarchical structures of the 
authoritarian PRI.  
A linear narrative between TCOs and historical precedents such as neoliberalism 
would oversimplify the shifting landscape of irregular warfare in Mexico, but a closer 
analysis of state formation and global economic patterns of development are crucial to 
understanding Los Zetas and their unique characteristics. I will examine how Los Zetas’ 
use of irregular warfare and their use of hypermodern superstructures of hegemony 
caused instability, weakening Mexican state authority. Ultimately, this instability allowed 
a space for private capital to invest and exploit. This is the paradox: Los Zetas use the 
tools of modernity and globalization to advance economic interests and simultaneously 
uphold elite and imperialistic structures that seek to subjugate their interests and the 
interests of Mexican sovereignty more broadly.  
In the end, Los Zetas’ greatest power became their greatest weakness, and while 
their extreme strategies of coercion worked to solidify power, they simultaneously 
magnified criminal operations, facilitating widespread retaliation. The group’s unique 
structure challenged entrenched hierarchies, uniting seemingly disparate interests to 
strike against the disruptors. This is a story about the power of interaction between 
different spheres of operation, in which state formation and economic policies facilitate 
shifts within TCO structures. It is also a story about the power of popular resistance, a 




Replications of Modernity 
In May of 2013, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, announced 
four men were facing up to twenty years in prison after they had been convicted of 
laundering millions of dollars of illicit Zeta funds to “purchase, train, breed and race 
American quarter horses in the United States.”1 The complex conspiracy to legitimate 
proceeds involved using straw purchasers to make transactions. The launderers were 
also careful to make deposits under $10,000 to avoid mandatory bank reporting federal 
requirements.2 Jose Treviño Morales, the brother of Zeta leader Miguel Treviño 
Morales, was among those convicted. When the FBI arrested the seemingly ordinary 
Jose Treviño, a bricklayer by trade, he reportedly told the arresting officers, “You can 
pick your friends, you can’t pick your family.”3 Jose Treviño was remembered fondly by 
equine lovers. Former American Quarter Horse Association president Jim Helzer recalls 
Jose blended seamlessly into the community, saying “you would think he was the nicest 
guy who ever walked.”  
Oklahoma City Clerk Kim McClarney also had good things to say about Jose: 
“He played the part of the cowboy, very respectful. I was shocked to hear the brother 
 
1 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, Federal 
Jury in Austin Convicts Fourth in Multi-Million Dollar Money Laundering Conspiracy Involving 
Los Zetas Drug Trafficking Proceeds, Extortion, and Bribery: Cash from the Sale of Drugs was 
Laundered to Purchase, Train, Breed, and Race American Quarter Horses in U.S., May 9, 2013, 
accessed on April 1, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/federal-jury-austin-convicts-
fourt-multi-million-dollar-money-laundering-conspiracy. 
2 DOJ, Federal Jury Convicts Fourth.  
3 Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses Allegedly Linked to Zetas Drug Cartel Draws 





was…evil, and is into beheadings!”4 While people were shocked and appalled an 
associate of Los Zetas was hiding in plain sight, and insisted they were not interested 
“in those drug cartel horses,”5 prospective buyers quickly cast their outrage aside in the 
name of a good bargain. In all, more than four hundred quarter horses sold without 
issue, yielding more than nine million dollars.6 Additionally, the U.S. Government sought 
a monetary judgment of sixty million dollars, the amount they estimated was derived 
from the illegal operation.  
Scholars such as George Grayson sensationalize the violence and sadism of Los 
Zetas, dwelling on beheadings and boiled bodies rather than the historical causes that 
facilitated the group’s growth. For instance, Grayson characterizes Zeta leader Miguel 
Treviño Morales (Z-40) as a man who “could not sleep at night unless he killed,”7 
arguing Los Zetas’ violence is a manifestation of top leaders’ sadistic personality 
disorder (SPD)—a disorder where one “derives pleasure from harming or humiliating 
others.”8 Schemes such as the complex money laundering operation not only question 
the simplicity of such frameworks but illustrate the transnational complexity of Los 
Zetas’ operations. By examining the group’s history, structure, technology, and 
transnational connections, this chapter will move beyond sadism and argue for the 
exceptionalism of Los Zetas. 
While extreme forms of violence are crucial to the branding and forms of coercion 
utilized by Los Zetas and should be examined in detail, hyperbole obscures the context 
 
4 Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses.” 
5 Dallasnews Administrator, “Auction of Horses.” 
6 DOJ, Federal Jury Convicts Fourth.  
7 Grayson, Evolution of Los Zetas, 6. 
8 Grayson, Evolution of Los Zetas, 5. 
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of the violence. The sensationalism has likewise dramatically influenced popular 
conceptions of Latin American countries, framing them as inherently violent, residing 
outside modern, civil society. Z-40 can no doubt be categorized as sadistic but how 
could this extreme form of sadism thrive within the organization? Why was their brand 
and structure replicated throughout Mexico? A few sadistic leaders cannot transform the 
structure of criminal organizations without collaboration, collusion, and consent. In short, 
why here, why now, and why did it spread?  
2.1 Genesis 
The rise of globalization and policy shifts such as NAFTA transformed the state 
of Tamaulipas, the cradle of Los Zetas, into a region that was increasingly coveted and 
contested by TCOs. With eighteen border crossings, more than any other state in 
Mexico, and with Nuevo Laredo handling “approximately 40 percent of the trade 
between Mexico and the United States,”9 the area became a booming center of growth. 
In Nuevo Laredo alone, “over eight thousand vehicles and more than three hundred 
thousand people cross”10 into Texas via international bridges every day. Tamaulipas 
became a key region for corporate and criminal expansion alike, forming a gateway to 
markets and capital.  
Due to an increase in trade, cities along the border, including Nuevo Laredo, 
Miguel Alemán, Reynosa, Río Bravo, and Matamoros, assumed a more fluid quality, 
and a rapid increase in the movement of legitimate goods within Tamaulipas was 
inverted and then replicated by TCOs, who were able to fill the power vacuum left by a 
weakened state with both merchandise and power. Reduced trade barriers, dissolving 
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rigid border demarcations, had the unintended consequence of creating a robust space 
through which Los Zetas’ exceptionalism could emerge triumphant, seeping into the 
fractures of state formation and globalization.  
Los Zetas were born from the deserters of elite Mexican forces in 1997.11 They 
were recruited by Osiel Cárdenas, leader of the Cártel del Golfo (CDG), who was 
becoming increasingly paranoid of assassination12 and used Los Zetas to “seize 
territory and dispatch rivals.”13 The group reportedly took its name from leader Arturo 
Guzmán Decena’s military call sign (Z-1),14 and members of the organization assumed 
their individual Zeta identities with an accompanying number, facilitating a more 
cohesive group identity and militarized culture. A person who assumes the identity of a 
letter and a number, becomes partially stripped of their individual identity, leaving space 
for a collective identity where group mandates can assume control of the collectivized 
self. In this way, the collective identity can be viewed as a method for subverting 
individual identities. 
Guzmán recruited an additional 30 members from Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas 
Especiales (GAFE), offering better pay (Cárdenas offered new recruits $3000 to invest 
in illicit commodities)15 in exchange for loyalty and obedience. Guzmán was born in 
Puebla, Mexico in 1976 while Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano, Z-3, was born on December 
25, 1975, in the rural village of Apan, Hidalgo, Mexico. Lazcano joined the military at the 
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age of seventeen, later gaining promotion to GAFE. While in the military, original 
members such as Guzmán and Lazcano “completed specialized training in intelligence 
collection, surveillance techniques, and operational planning,”16 creating a solid 
foundation for their professionalization of violence within the criminal community.  
 Considering both Guzmán and Lazcano, Los Zetas’ leading members, both 
come from areas of concentrated poverty, we can view their need for economic mobility, 
a need that was not met by military service, as a primary motivator for deserting GAFE. 
The military, then, can be viewed as a training ground and bridge for additional 
economic expansion, a necessity that was influenced by rampant underdevelopment. 
The economic and cultural alienation of the non-elite following globalization is partially 
manifested in the continuing expansion of informal economic sectors and the 
emergence of non-state actors such as Guzmán and Lazcano, who can be viewed as 
progenies of economic policies. This is not an argument of linearity, but a thread in the 
tapestry of causality.  
Treviño Morales, Z-40, was born in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, around 1970 
(there are varying records as to his year of birth) to a working-class family, and spent 
his teenage years working “for the wealthy, cleaning yards, chimneys and cars,” all the 
while detesting “Mexico’s de facto caste system, which pounded a sense of inferiority 
into its poorer citizens.”17 During his teenage years, Z-40 migrated to Dallas, Texas, 
where he encountered additional bias against the Latinx community, marginalized by 
economics and ethnicity. Oscar Hagelsieb, assistant special agent in charge of the 
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investigative unit of U.S. immigration and Customs enforcement in El Paso, says Z-40 
“felt Mexican immigrants were discriminated against, that Americans were too 
prejudiced against Mexican immigrants.”18 These grievances against a system Treviño 
Morales felt was designed to subjugate left him enraged, and were echoed by his 
family. Z-40’s older brother, Juan Francisco, moved to Texas in 1978, and worked as a 
bricklayer. During his trial for marijuana distribution in 1995, Juan Francisco recalled 
how he and Z-40 “’would work all week long, Saturdays and Sundays, sometimes 
holidays. Sometimes in the whole month, there was barely a day off for us.’”19  
The legacy of imperial hierarchies, partially manifested in the servitude and 
exploitation of formerly colonized peoples, a new fluidity of the border, and increased 
economic marginalization wrought through neoliberal policies, cannot create sadistic 
“monsters” but it can become a factor in a person’s trajectory. The inability to compete 
during globalization, as viewed through early members of Los Zetas, highlights the 
discontinuity of the connective economic system, the paradox of globalization. 
Transparent spaces for trade and exchange should provide mobility for now globalized 
citizens, not simply the objects they transport. In the case of Treviño Morales and 
Guzmán, an inverted narrative emerges whereby they, and others in similar 
circumstances, were both limited and liberated in their movements and identities by the 
fluidity of borders, leaving them to create mobility in the zone of inversion using the tools 
of globalization. Z-40 directed a multitude of non-state actors to distribute violence 
within the group’s territories, operating with near impunity throughout the state of 
Tamaulipas. Without the consent of the group, especially considering their meritocratic 
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structure, actors such as Z-40, who spread a unique brand of coercion, would not have 
thrived within the syndicate. In short, the sadism of one leader can only spread through 
support within the organization.   
2.2 Structural Exceptionalism 
 In 2005, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
requested a control file be opened to “maintain information pertaining to the Los Zetas 
organization.”20 The communication categorizes the group as violent, heavily armed, 
and a “highly structured Hispanic gang that operates in the fashion of a paramilitary 
organization.”21 According to the report, members of GAFE who later became the 
original members of Los Zetas “trained in the U.S. at the School of the Americas at Fort 
Benning, GA,” and the “Zetas’ organizational structure includes counterintelligence, 
intelligence and tactical enforcement units.”22 The recruitment of elite soldiers within 
criminal organizations is integral to Los Zetas’ model, diffusing throughout TCOs in 
Mexico. Establishing the extent to which criminal syndicates have recruited special 
forces has proven difficult to quantify. According to political scientist Dr. Correa-
Cabrera, “It’s an inconvenient issue for the government, so they deny freedom-of-
information requests,” but Mexico’s Ministry of Defence estimate 1,383 elite soldiers 
deserted between 1994 and 2015.23 The militarization of criminal syndicates, formed in 
part through training provided by the U.S. Government, not only illuminates the 
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transnationalism of the group, but marks a clear divergence from previous criminal 
syndicates who relied upon amateur protection. Furthermore, while traditional TCOs 
employed a vertical hierarchy, fusing alliances through blood and marriage, Los Zetas 
transitioned to a more decentralized structure.  
In the old compadres system,24 mobility is attained not simply through blood and 
marriage but through longstanding informal contracts, relying on the authoritarian PRI to 
solidify power and protection through its network of players. The weakening of the PRI, 
changing administrations, and the rapid growth of private capital fractured what was 
once a stable system of impunity and collusion amongst powerful players. Political 
scientist Jorge Chabat discusses the contention that the CDG’s decline, which occurred 
after the arrest of Juan García Abrego in 1996, was “related to the fact that the Salinas 
administration protected it, and that this protection vanished with the arrival of the 
Zedillo administration.”25 Chabat makes it clear this speculation is impossible to prove, 
but that Abrego testified during his trial that CDG had obtained illicit goods from 
“seizures made by the attorney general’s office.”26  
Los Zetas’ replication of fractures within state power can be viewed through their 
organizational structure. While the group had an overarching militaristic culture, strong 
leaders, and a collective identity, the organization allowed individual cells to operate 
somewhat autonomously, exploiting resources and diversifying interests based on the 
local environment. Their massive diversification of operations, a key divergence from 
previous TCOs, included entry into activities such as “public corruption, alien smuggling, 
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kidnapping, assault, murder extortion, and money laundering.”27 Instead of operating 
through a centralized command structure, the group operated more like a franchise,28 
using their unique brand, that of brutal and indiscriminate violence, to recruit and 
subjugate, ensuring territories complied with taxation but also permitting variation.   
The decentralization was compounded when Miguel Guzmán Decena (Z-1) was 
killed during a shootout in November of 2002, and the structural void left by Guzmán 
went unfilled. While Lazcano, Z-3, assumed some form of leadership within the 
organization, Los Zetas “likely developed a more fluid structure with commanders roving 
the South Texas border.”29 In effect, there were “few clear lines distinguishing between 
full-fledged members, associates, and imitators”30 Thus, members who profited and 
gained mobility by exploiting the more fluid border economy and the weakness of the 
state, became more localized during their day-to-day activities. While the culture, or 
blueprint, of Los Zetas remained intact, the structural shifts and decentralization 
increased the group’s operative autonomy from CDG, anticipating their continuing 
independence and eventual split from the alliance, known as the Company, that 
occurred in 2010.  
The localized approach allowed for more flexibility and is facilitated by a more 
robust border economy following accelerated liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. As 
the decentralization of state authority is replicated by Los Zetas, the fluidity within the 
organizational structure exists in continuity with border regions. Diversification of profits 
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through extortion of small business owners and informal economic actors is aided by 
the informal economy that operates outside traditional economic structures, as Los 
Zetas operate outside traditional organizational structures. The structure of Los Zetas, 
then, can be viewed as contingent upon the structure of trade liberalization without 
which the group would be trapped within a command economy and traditional 
hierarchical structures.   
2.3 Technology 
 Los Zetas’ proprietary radio network utilized technology in unique and modern 
ways, illuminating the benefits advanced technology can offer criminal syndicates. In 
2006, the organization began to construct a large-scale radio communication network 
throughout the Gulf Coast states of Mexico, aiming to “establish a proprietary, real-time 
communications infrastructure,”31 to gather intelligence and coordinate operations. The 
operation was managed by Jose Luis Del Toro Estrada, a seemingly innocuous 
shopkeeper who owned a radio equipment store in Texas until his arrest during an 
extensive international law enforcement operation, known as “Project Reckoning.” 
Estrada, known as El Tecníco, not only set up the radio network, the infrastructure 
through which Los Zetas coordinated sophisticated operations, but he oversaw a secret 
network of cameras through which the group could surveil Mexican officials and stash 
houses. Carl Pike, head of the DEA Special Operations Division, asserts the technology 
allowed the group to track operations as well as “Mexican Police, military, even U.S. 
border-patrol agents.”32  
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The radio network was preferable to cell phones so the group could operate in 
areas outside cell networks and so they could switch frequencies to evade law 
enforcement, garbling transmissions if necessary. In urban settings, such as Nuevo 
Laredo, Estrada would have identified “unused frequencies to avoid interference from 
the likes of taxi and truck drivers’ radio chatter.”33 After the frequencies were mapped, 
they implemented the physical components of the network. Once the infrastructure was 
constructed, they had a “command-and-control capacity,”34 with DEA agent Pike stating 
the technology linked the members of Los Zetas and CDG (before they split) so that 
halcones (lookouts) could contact commanders to evade the authorities. The 
infrastructure illustrates a sophisticated use of technology that was not standard within 
criminal syndicates and highlights Los Zetas use of apparatus normally reserved for the 
state. The advanced system, which allowed for increased communications connectivity, 
is a transgression of state territory, uniquely challenging sovereignty and paving the way 
for other TCOs to utilize technology for the purpose of subversion.  
2.4 Legacy of Militarization  
Los Zetas’ transnational interactions become evident upon examination of the 
group’s connection to Guatemalan Kaibiles, an elite special forces unit who are known 
for their counterinsurgency skills. In 2005, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
reported Los Zetas were “using Kailbiles to train new members,” suggesting the Zeta 
leadership, following heavy leadership losses, no longer had the internal capability to 
train new recruits.35  DEA intelligence, too, concluded such transnational cooperation, 
 
33 Halverson, “Los Zetas Proprietary,” 78. 
34 Tabor, “Radio Tecnico.” 




reporting that a Zeta member, after their arrest on September 10, 2005, stated the 
group “had recruited former Guatemalan Kailbiles to work with the Zetas and that the 
Kailbiles were procuring firearms and grenades from Guatemala,”36 so Los Zetas could 
expand territory. While intelligence documents assert anticorruption efforts in Mexico 
had hampered the recruitment of Mexican military members by criminal syndicates, the 
“Guatemalan military downsizing from 1994 through 2004 created a pool of special 
forces-trained candidates for the Zetas to draw on to train new Zeta members or offset 
personnel shortfalls.”37 Mexican intelligence reached similar conclusions with regards to 
the Zeta-Kaibil connection, with Mexican Attorney General Santiago asserting the need 
for Kaibil training was due to a stream of arrests of original Zeta members.38  
The Kaibiles, who were instrumental in quelling guerillas during the 36-year Civil 
War (1960-1996) in Guatemala, and who were known for human rights violations, were 
heavily impacted by budget cuts and had few alternatives to military life after 1996. Of 
the 6,000 Kaibiles the Guatemalan Army has trained since 1975, approximately 360 
were still active in 2011.39 Privates earned 250 dollars a month, with Kaibiles garnering 
a bonus of thirty-eight dollars for transportation expenses. In contrast, Zeta recruiters 
offered 2,000 dollars a month to work for the organization.40 Like the original Zeta 
members, who were drawn to illegal economic sectors to facilitate growth, the 
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downsizing of the Guatemalan military facilitated a similar outcome, with trained 
members of the military migrating to TCOs, highlighting the unintended consequences 
of military deconstruction. When you combine advanced training, a robust military 
culture, and little hope of economic mobility, especially considering the instability 
wrought through the Civil War, we find motivation for TCO migration.  
When expanding their territory, Los Zetas were known to use propaganda to 
“alert and warn the local population”41 that they were operating in the region. These 
alerts were also used to recruit new members from the military. For instance, in one 
Mexican town, Los Zetas used a banner to promise new members “three square meals 
a day, in lieu of ramen noodles,” reportedly a “staple in the Mexican military.”42  
The propaganda not only offers a more lucrative lifestyle but illuminates the state’s 
inability to provide adequate sustenance for its agents. Compared to previous criminal 
syndicates in Mexico, the tactic more thoroughly utilizes propaganda to expand and 
coerce, while simultaneously exploiting the economic marginalization of military 
members. The strategies for expansion, most notably extreme forms of violent coercion, 
likewise illuminates the inability of the state, decentralized like the zeta cells, to uphold 
the public safety of its citizens, arguably the state’s principal responsibility. 
To better understand linkages between militarization and Los Zetas, it is crucial 
to examine militarization in Latin America during the Cold War. Specifically, it is 
important to explore U.S. interventions and complicity in the militarization of right-wing 
authoritarian regimes. To mitigate the spread of communism, and solidify U.S. power 
within the continent, the U.S. destabilized governments in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
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Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and British Guiana (Guyana), 
between 1945 and 1989.43 These interventions occurred despite the fact there was little 
evidence to support international connections between the Soviet Union and leftist 
movements in Latin America. Historians argue interventions were less related to 
communism and more related to colonial predilections and the desire to “maintain 
peace and stability, exclude foreign influences, expand U.S. trade and investment, and 
shape Latin America’s political, sociological, and ideological development.”44  
U.S. intervention in Guatemala during the 1950s and the decision to destabilize 
the constitutional government of Guatemala had devastating consequences for people 
living in the region. During the four decades of violent upheaval, at least two hundred 
thousand people would die. The conflict served as laboratory for the CIA who developed 
strategies to combat insurgents and included psychological warfare and the infiltration 
of labor unions and student groups. These tools of U.S. hegemony would be used 
throughout the continent during the Cold War.45 Furthermore, U.S. support of death 
squads sent a message to other leftist organizations that the U.S. would not support 
democratic change by socialist factions, leaving violent revolution as the only path to 
victory. When human rights violations occurred, the U.S. argued Latin America was 
inherently violent due to the region’s culture and history. For instance, a U.S. State 
Department study in 1986 examining state terror argued Guatemala was simply a 
violent society, neglecting the socioeconomic disparity formed through colonial and Cold 
War endeavors. Similarly, Los Zetas’ violent acts and human rights violations are 
 
43 Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxxv. 
44 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 1. 
45 Rabe, The Killing Zone, 36. 
 
 28 
framed as inherent to Mexican culture rather than a production of historical factors such 
as militarization during the Cold War. 
In a January 4, 1966, Agency for International Development (AID) cable, for 
instance, U.S. Public Safety Advisor John Longan, who was selected to assist the 
Government of Guatemala’s (GOG) “law enforcement authorities on techniques and 
methods for combatting terrorists, kidnapping, and extortion tactics,”46 details the plan to 
assist the GOG in counter-insurgency tactics, both covert and overt, immediate and 
long-range. Included in these plans, was immediate raids in Guatemala City, where 
police forces “were given detailed instructions on how to seal off given areas” to force 
communists out of hiding and into the hands of the authorities.47 During the covert 
phase, the GOG was instructed to set up a safe house where all information regarding 
subversive activities was to be sent to avoid communist penetration.  
In Guatemala, July 1968, the CIA was informed by an undisclosed source that 
due to concerns over “unfavorable publicity of past counter-insurgency operations,” 
going forward any insurgents “killed by Guatemalan security forces must appear to have 
died in an armed encounter, regardless of the manner in which actually died.”48 What’s 
more, a judge was to be called to validate the narrative of the “encounter whenever 
possible.”49 It is within this space of transnational complicity, where the military was 
weaponized against popular uprisings, that the Kaibiles, along with their specific brand 
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of violence, evolved. A perfect storm emerged whereby the Kaibiles, highly trained and 
stripped of economic autonomy by demilitarization, became poised to collaborate with 
Los Zetas, who were likewise born from the U.S.-trained GAFE, also used in quelling 
leftist insurgencies, specifically in Chiapas in 1994. In this way, the U.S. Cold War policy 
coupled with the marginalization of globalization, birthed revised TCO structures and 
operational capacity.  
The Zeta-Kaibil connection confirms the transnational repercussions of 
militarization. In post-Cold War conflicts, state militarization has had a multitude of 
consequences in regions that have a heavy TCO presence. Critics assert when the 
military suppresses social movements “it becomes difficult to distinguish between the 
force employed to combat organized crime and that directed at social protest.”50 Similar 
to the way democratization of both the state and markets connects to the structure of 
Los Zetas, militarization connects to Los Zetas’ methods for coercion and control. 
Militarization fostered the culture and training for original Zeta members and remains a 
powerful force in the group’s organizational and social evolution.  
2.5 Forms of Coercion 
 The extreme forms of violence utilized by Los Zetas transformed the landscape 
within criminal organizations, but can we, as outlined by Koonings,51 characterize this as 
a new form of violence, and how much does this diverge from the ideologically 
motivated violence that dominated the Cold War period? In short, is there a significant 
categorical shift in forms of violence? During a 2018 Wilson Center discussion on Los 
Zetas, analysist Steven Dudley engaged with socially and economically motivated 
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violence, arguing that Los Zetas may not be a political organization, but their 
expressions of power are nevertheless incredibly political.52 It is true that the 
organization may not be politically motivated but they are, in fact, politically influenced, 
forged through political context, including the Cold War, global economic policies, and 
state formation, and the outcomes of their actions are extremely political, so their 
actions can be categorized as political. Like most TCOs, Los Zetas are largely driven by 
the desire for economic and social mobility. This can be viewed as a replication of 
economic liberalization as well as a reaction to economic marginalization, part of the 
new model of violence. The experience of Treviño Morales, working in servitude for the 
needs of the wealthy was not unique, and while this cannot be framed as causality for 
Los Zetas’ participation in violent criminality, it can be understood as, by nature, a 
political experience.  
Von Clausewitz argues war is a continuation of the political,53 and while the 
irregular warfare utilized by Los Zetas falls outside traditional ideological conflict, these 
forms of violence are clearly a challenge to state authority and a political expression 
with significant consequences. These challenges are often manifested in confrontations 
with state agents. In 2006 and 2007, according to a DEA cable, Los Zetas increased 
direct confrontations with the Mexican military, executing public officials on multiple 
occasions.54 For instance, on December 14, 2007, two soldiers were assassinated after 
they had participated in an operation that resulted in the seizure of seven tons of 
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marijuana.55 While challenges to state authority are not unique to Los Zetas, the 
characteristics of the organization, including their decentralized structure, militaristic 
culture, indiscriminate violence, among other idiosyncrasies, magnifies their challenges 
in unique ways, presenting a new context for such defiance. 
In 2004, after posing as “Mexican soldiers and federal agents in military vehicles, 
approximately 40 armed Zetas broke into the Apatzingán prison in Michoacán, 
Mexico.”56 The interaction challenges the authority of the state on multiple levels. While 
the military uniforms were worn as a disguise to avoid detection, the “disguise” can be 
interpreted as an infiltration of state power where the lines of legitimacy are blurred 
beyond recognition. If the state no longer has the power or authority to secure its 
prisoners and thus ensure public safety, the disguise becomes reality within the space 
of legitimate authority. Additionally, the elements of corruption within police forces can 
be viewed as a method to transfer authority to TCOs.  
In Nuevo Laredo in 2005, the infiltration of the organization into the local police 
force was so widespread, with the FBI asserting that “until June 2005, Los Zetas 
effectively controlled the police force,”57 that the Mexican State sent federal forces into 
Nuevo Laredo to retain control of the city. Former legitimate agents of the state, Los 
Zetas, collaborating with current legitimate agents of the state, all while assuming the 
identity and culture of the military, creates confusion within the public sphere. Thus, the 
public is thrust into a realm of statelessness, where multiple actors with authority exert 
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control. In this way, the public, reacting to multiple agents of authority, assumes a 
degree of autonomy, where they exist outside the control of a single authority.  
When agents of the state did not submit to the group’s authority, the 
consequences could be dire. This was the case on June 7, 2005, when Nuevo Laredo 
Police Chief Alejandro Dominguez Coello was murdered hours after he was sworn in. 
Fifty-six-year-old Coello, who was formerly the head of the Nuevo Laredo Chamber of 
Commerce, spoke to reporters about his decision to take a job many deemed not worth 
the risk, declaring, “I’m not beholden to anyone. My commitment is to the citizenry,” and 
“those who should be afraid are those who have been compromised.”58 Hours later, the 
new chief was fired upon as he “climbed into his Ford pickup.”59 The agency of Coello 
and his quest to ensure justice in the face of widespread impunity60 illustrates the 
inability of the state to ensure the safety of its agents. Considering the local police force 
was heavily infiltrated by TCOs, the exchange also illuminates continuous fractures 
within protective sectors of government.   
2.6 Replication of Structure 
 The replication of Los Zetas’ structures and culture is crucial to the contention 
that the group represents a turning point in the trajectory of criminal organizations in 
Mexico. La Familia Michoacana (LFM) is a notable example of the replication of the 
Zeta model but like any reproduction it is full of modifications and idiosyncrasies. 
Criminal enterprise in Michoacán, which is home to a large population of rural farmers, 
was under the control of El Milenio, which was under the control of its parent 
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organization in Tijuana, when fractures within alliances prompted Los Zetas to assume 
power in the region in 2003.61  
Los Zetas, “good teachers but bad landlords,”62 trained former Milenio members 
in their brand of irregular warfare to disrupt Tijuana and expand into a region key to the 
cultivation of marijuana and the poppy. Familia worked in collaboration with Los Zetas to 
overthrow the traditional crime family in Michoacán, the Valencias, illustrating a modern 
alliance that sought to overthrow the “pre-modern” system that relied on lineage. LFM, 
however, became increasingly agitated by Los Zetas, viewing the group as a disruptive 
presence in the region. The inter-alliance conflict exemplifies the ability of Los Zetas to 
export their model within Mexico but their inability to do so without modifications.   
Eventually, and after significant conflict, the LFM were able to successfully expel 
Los Zetas from Michoacán, expanding to Guerrero, Morelos, Guanajuato, Queretaro, 
Jalisco, and Mexico City. LFM’s use of modern marketing techniques recalls the 
propaganda of Los Zetas, especially their use of banners. Combined with their use of 
extreme violence, LFM can be viewed as the offspring of Los Zetas.  In September of 
2006, for instance, LFM announced their “existence”63 into the arena of criminal 
organizations by reproducing Los Zetas’ coercive methods of spectacular violence and 
propaganda. “After firing a round of shots into the air, they ordered the patrons to lie on 
their stomachs, tore open a plastic bag, and tossed five severed heads across the 
floor.”64 Once the heads were on the floor, the group differentiated themselves from Los 
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Zetas through a banner that read, “’La Familia doesn’t kill for money; it doesn’t kill 
women; it doesn’t kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die. Everyone 
should know…this is divine justice.’”65 From their first act as an official organization, the 
group frames their work as a protective element, fusing the methods of Zetas with a 
paternal air of security.  
 Jean Franco proposes the dead body, when mutilated, can be transformed into 
objects and used as “messages for the civilian population or the enemy,”66 claiming acts 
where the logic of the killer is clear are “expressive crimes.”67 During the nightclub 
incident, LFM’s expressive crime implicitly communicates their alliance with Los Zetas, 
by now their mortal enemy, in that their form of coercion is aligned with the methods 
employed by Los Zetas, that they are willing to take extreme measures to challenge 
rivals. LFM makes clear, however, that they diverge from Los Zetas by assuming a 
moral code that prohibits the murder of “innocents” in the battle for territory and 
sovereignty. While both LFM and the Zetas used propaganda and the human body as 
expressive acts of power, and are thus political, LFM transcends the precedent set by 
Zetas in that they align themselves with forms of justice and Christianity. In fact, the 
group’s use of beheading elevated Zeta coercive techniques, and illuminates LFM’s 
utilization of expressive criminality, leaving Los Zetas to call the group “radical 
Islamists,” driven “crazy by ice.”68  
The group, therefore, like any successful protégé, takes the Zetas’ most effective 
methodology, that of spectacular, if violent, coercion, and fuses it with morality as 
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justification for its actions. The LFM model, while continuing to challenge the state and 
illuminate its deficits, fills the vacuum of state power by funding “food and medicine, 
public works projects, and low interest loans”69 to the economically marginalized 
population of Michoacán. While many criminal organizations have been known to 
provide social programs to the public, acting as a proto-welfare state, LFM created 
infrastructure in the region not previously implemented by TCOs, including rehabilitation 
centers for populations suffering from substance abuse (there is evidence to suggest 
this was a recruiting tool for LFM). NAFTA and the 2008-10 recession left people living 
in areas such as Lazaro, Cardenas, Morelia “uprooted from their families, unemployed, 
poorly educated, and homeless.”70 Other forms of governance provided by the LFM 
include “regulating the prices of agricultural products and establishing harvesting 
periods, giving licenses for forestry activities, giving permits for festivals and religious 
events.”71 Weakness within bureaucratic and political institutions, especially glaring in 
Michoacán where access to social services within low-income communities was 
inadequate, created a space through which LFM could expand operations.  
LFM frames this form of governance as protection, recalling the inability of the 
state to ensure the safety and prosperity of its citizens. After the group’s spiritual leader, 
Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, was supposedly killed in a military operation in 2010 (he 
was, in fact, not killed until 2014), the public reaction was mixed. During a march for 
peace following the operation, “some protestors held signs saying, “Viva la Familia,”  
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and “Nazario will always live in our hearts.”72 While it was reported that the protestors 
were planted by LFM, the interaction shows the contradictory reactions of the public. 
State officials likewise showed support for LFM, with the mayor of Apatzingán declaring, 
“La Familia does not cause violence, the government does.”73 While popular support for 
Los Zetas in Tamaulipas or Michoacán was virtually nonexistent, the mixed reaction of 
the public following the death of Nazario may be an indication that LFM was successful 
at adopting the Zeta model in effective ways, exhibiting the group’s ability to synthesize 
modern and traditional methods to solidify power.  
2.7 Challenges 
 The structural decentralization of Los Zetas allowed for increased mobility when 
operating locally, and the group’s diversification was a significant factor in their 
economic growth, both components of their exceptionalism. The recruitment of highly 
trained members, however, became challenging as military operations often resulted in 
the arrest or death of original Zetas. In short, the decentralized and horizontal model 
was a contributing factor for the organization’s rapid ascent as well as their decline. 
While there was a high barrier for entry into traditional criminal organizations, you must 
be entrenched within the vertical hierarchy by birth or other longstanding alliance, the 
low barrier for entry for Los Zetas proved a catastrophic liability in the end.74  
To expand, Los Zetas had to recruit from below, outside the military model, which 
led to the monopolization of local resources, as local actors, much like unregulated 
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capitalism, extorted beyond sustainable parameters. While groups such as LFM 
reframed local extortion in terms of protection, Los Zetas never pivoted from their 
aggressive extortive patterns, depleting the local economy of its meager resources, and 
fomenting dissent and hostility within local populations. The extreme coercive tactics of 
the group simultaneously ignited loathing from traditional criminal syndicates, the 
government, and the public against their common enemy. From a security perspective, 
the high value targeting strategy utilized by the military against Los Zetas proved a 
success story. In general, however, the “kingpin strategy” has been viewed as an 
abysmal failure by analysts who favor a more complicated policy of coordinated middle-
level targeting.75 
 Eventually, the once powerful organization would fragment beyond recognition. 
Lazcano, or Z-3, was allegedly killed by Mexican security forces in Coahuila in October 
of 2012, his body quickly disappeared. The disappearance of Lazcano marks a moment 
when the fragmentation of the organization accelerated dramatically.76 Los Zetas 
proved exceptional in their model, but this was not due to the sadistic qualities of the 
group’s leaders or the inherent violence of its members. Instead, Los Zetas’ evolution 
was deeply rooted in complex social and historical factors, including militarization and 
globalization, that created an environment conducive for a new brand of criminality.
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Impunity and Opposition 
 
In 2011, the Mexican municipality of Allende became the locus of Los Zetas’ 
retribution and an example of the rampant criminal impunity within local governments. 
After the DEA leaked the fact that they had secured the cell phone personal 
identification numbers of Zeta leaders Miguel Trevino Morales (Z-40) and his brother 
Omar, both of whom lived in Allende, to Mexican security forces, the brothers 
erroneously traced the leak to longtime Allende resident and Zeta ally Jose Luis Garza, 
Jr., a rancher whose family had deep roots in the region.1 Beginning on the evening of 
March 18, 2011, residents noticed large groups of outsiders streaming into the 
municipality, prompting many locals to hunker down in the otherwise quiet town. Retired 
government worker Guadalupe Garcia recalls eating at a local restaurant when two 
young men came in to order some fifty hamburgers to go.2 What may seem an 
innocuous event triggered a sense of foreboding in Garcia, who trusted her intuition and 
decided to head home.3 The streets remained deserted that night, and over the next 
three days Los Zetas waged a war on the residents of Allende, kidnapping, murdering, 
and burning the bodies of up to 300 people.  
Many of the victims were handed over to Los Zetas by local police and had no 
ties to criminal organizations. The massacre embodies the indiscriminate violence 
utilized by Los Zetas and the impunity through which they operated, but it also highlights 
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the multidirectional exchange of violence and the culture of resistance within Mexico. 
The official investigation stalled for years, leaving vast amounts of evidence, including 
bone and tooth fragments, to sit undisturbed in the ashes of abandoned ranches.4 In 
2014, however, a more robust investigation ensued, and a special task force was 
established.5 The investigation was prompted in large part by investigative journalism in 
Mexico and the United States as well as external pressures from human rights 
organizations.  
The abundance of compelling testimony that came from the investigation was a 
powerful tool for substantive change, illuminating the importance of activism in the fight 
against criminal organizations. While human rights violations in Mexico are often viewed 
as a unidirectional interaction, the multidirectional impact of testimony and acts of 
resistance, often obscured by violence, emerge apparent in the case of Allende.  
The massacres in Allende and Tamaulipas are viewed within the framework of 
victimhood but an equally significant component of the interaction deals with how the 
disconnection between crime and justice has led to a more robust discourse on 
criminality and fueled resistance within personal and media spaces. To better 
understand the genesis of resistance to Los Zetas, this chapter will first establish 
historical linkages between TCO opposition, the Dirty War in Guerrero, and the 
democratization of Mexico.   
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3.1 Resistance in Guerrero 
Chapter 3 examined the transnational interaction between Los Zetas and the 
Kaibiles, arguing their alignment was connected to a shared military culture and 
demilitarization post-1996. The Mexican Dirty War, similarly, illuminates the interaction 
between violent political repression, a culture of popular resistance, and popular 
opposition to criminal organizations. The Dirty War in Guerrero, specifically, and the 
conflict between the state and leftist guerillas Genaro Vazquez, of the National 
Revolutionary Civic Association (ACNR), and Lucio Cabañas, of the Party of the Poor, 
provides a window through which to view Los Zetas professionalization of violence and 
military culture, as well as their replication of state repression. Simultaneously, the 
resistance of the Guerrerense anticipates the acts of opposition in the face of Zeta 
coercion.  
During the late 1960s and 1970s, Cabañas and Vázquez led a series of attacks 
in the mountains of Guerrero, arguing the promises of the 1910 Revolution had fallen 
woefully short of its goals and the people of Guerrero had suffered the consequences. 
Historian O’Neill Blacker argues that while Mexico had a relatively successful revolution, 
with the government implementing social welfare programs and President Cárdenas 
initiating agrarian land reform, it was “the government’s failure to fulfill their potential, 
rather than demands for creation, that led to popular discontent.”6 Mexico outwardly 
supported international socialist revolutions, including those in Chile and Cuba, but 
stood opposed to internal policy changes that would meaningfully alter inequities. The 
contradictions of Mexico, including its stance on international revolutions, served as a 
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façade that “masked internal policies”7 that promoted state-sponsored human rights 
violations and the violent repression of popular uprisings. In other words, the PRI’s 
consolidation of power took precedence over revolutionary values.  
During the 1960s, Guerrero became an epicenter of racial and economic 
disparity, ranking among the poorest states in Mexico.8 The “Mexican Miracle,” in which 
the PRI consolidated power and assisted Allies during WWII by developing industrial 
sectors to support war efforts, was only a miracle for a select few and a gap in wealth 
dramatically increased for Mexico’s poorest fifty percent.9 For the campesino, many of 
whom farmed coffee and coconuts, earning a living wage became challenging when the 
government cut credits to peasant organizations in 1955.10 By the late 1960s, 
approximately 62 percent of Guerrerense were illiterate,11 and between 1960 and 1970 
unemployment increased by 487 percent.12  
Both Lucio Cabañas and Genaro Vázquez began their paths to insurgency as 
educators and activists, working within a more traditional system of dissent. Teachers in 
the region headed social welfare programs, playing “instrumental roles in community 
life, furthering local improvements, intervening in relations with government, and in the 
generation after World War II, organizing movements for greater democracy and 
accountability in state and municipal politics.”13 As prominent activists, both Cabañas 
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and Vazquez led electoral efforts and organized opposition parties.14 In the face of 
popular opposition, however, the state became increasingly intent on militarization and 
repression. The authoritarian state was focused on continuing its hegemony and 
subverting revolutionary values rather than making policy changes that would address 
systemic inequities.  
In December of 1962, police fired upon Vázquez and a group of protesters during 
a sit-in outside the municipal palace in Iguala, “killing seven and injuring twenty-three.”15 
In 1967, during a protest in Atoyac, Cabañas and fellow protestors were also fired upon, 
killing several people, including Cabañas’s brother. “Facing a regime that repeatedly 
punished legal forms of pacific dissent and protest with violence,”16 both Vázquez and 
Cabañas sought justice outside the legal framework. The actions of the rebels represent 
a pattern in Mexico that can be viewed within the work of activists in Allende and 
Tamaulipas. The public, accustomed to the state’s inability to fulfill promises and ensure 
public safety, is forced to seek justice within marginalized zones.  
During a press conference, Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz, an architect of 
Dirty War policies, justified militarization, declaring “neither in the state of Guerrero nor 
in any part of the republic are there guerillas. Persons who rob and kill are not guerillas, 
they are bandits.”17 The PRI, “a national regime self-proclaimed as the “revolution 
turned into government,”18 refused to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the 
Guerrerense, that people were starving, that the state was not upholding its 
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responsibility, and instead rapidly militarized the region, sending 12,000 troops by 1971 
and more than double that amount by 1974.19 The history of militarization and human 
rights violations by the state sets a precedent for Los Zetas, who are trained within this 
culture.  
During the early 1970s, those displaced from traditional regions of dissent carried 
out a series of attacks against the Mexican elite, including the kidnapping of Senator 
Ruben Figueroa, who was a close friend of President Echeverria and the 
administration’s choice for governor of Guerrero. Echeverria outwardly refused to 
negotiate with “criminals” (even though Senator Figueroa later told a reporter a twenty-
five-million-peso ransom, or two million U.S. dollars, was negotiated for his release), 
sending “16,000 soldiers—about one third of the Mexican Army”20 to Guerrero. Figueroa 
was “rescued” by the military in September 1974, months after the initial kidnapping in 
May. Cabañas was not captured during the raid, but the military pressure following the 
string of high-profile kidnappings and assassinations proved fatal for the leader, who, on 
December 2, 1974, was killed in a shootout with the military.21 
While the life of Cabañas ended in 1974, the trauma of violence, as well as the 
impunity with which the state exerted its power remains in continuity with Mexican 
identity. In 2006, special prosecutors leaked their report on the Dirty War to the public. 
Investigators concluded that between the 1960s and 1980s, President Echeverria 
ordered a genocide in Guerrero and directed Secretary Hermenegildo Cuenca Diaz to 
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execute his plan. The military was ordered to kidnap, torture, and kill suspected 
subversives, with entire villages suspected of supporting Cabañas (mostly located in 
Ayotzinapa) destroyed.22 The soldiers “rounded up all the men and boys, executed 
some on the spot and detained others,” using rape, torture, beatings, electric shock, and 
the forced ingestion of gasoline to repress the uprising.23 Upon entering office in 2000, 
President Fox promised a more transparent state, declaring “No society can tolerate 
excesses and wrongs committed against human rights,”24 and while Fox and 
democratization had a role in the continuing investigations, it is activism outside the 
state that pushed for transparency and justice.  
The patterns solidified during the Dirty War are echoed in towns such as Allende 
on multiple levels. First, and most obviously, Los Zetas are the concrete result of the 
authoritarian militarization that flourished under U.S. Cold War interventions. Much like 
the military was directed to indiscriminately kidnap, torture, and kill whole villages in 
Ayotzinapa regardless of personal affiliation with Cabañas, everyone in Allende was 
subject to punishment by Los Zetas, regardless of involvement with the organization. 
Cesar Alfonso Garcia Ramirez was one such man. Garcia was friends with Everardo 
Elizondo, who worked at the Garza ranch and raised fighting cocks.25 Both men drove 
to the ranch on the night of March 18 to get medicine for a cockfight scheduled for that 
night. Garcia’s wife, Etelvina Rodriguez, became alarmed when her husband did not 
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respond to phone calls. The next morning Rodriguez drove by the ranch and noticed 
groups of hooded men with black vests and rifles.26 As she drove back to Allende, 
Rodriguez took a second look inside the ranch and noticed a pile of bodies next to a 
burning building. Past the entrance she saw Allende municipal police trucks and armed 
people she recognized as the police guarding the area.27 Like the atrocities of the Dirty 
War, the state was not enthusiastic about transparency, and did not want to illuminate 
the complicity of local officials in the murder of up to 300 people (the total population of 
Allende was only around 23,000). Evidence sat undisturbed for years without adequate 
investigation, requiring the media and survivor testimony, both mechanisms outside the 
traditional Mexican justice system, to illuminate the massacre.  
For Cabañas and Vázquez, the failure of the state to fulfill its promises, and its 
violent repression of legal protest, was viewed as an illegitimate and criminal act against 
the population, requiring extralegal forms of opposition. The complicity of the police in 
Allende can similarly be viewed as a criminal act against the population, requiring action 
outside an illegitimate local government. For survivors of the Guerrero conflict, a robust 
public discourse on the criminality of the state and the “structural culture of impunity”28 
became essential for securing justice for the 1200 disappeared29 as well as their 
families who suffered the trauma of militarization. The pattern of criminal impunity and 
state complicity recalls the certainty that the justice system “only punished those that did 
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not have the means to circumvent justice,”30 prompting the public to seek justice 
autonomously.  
The search for transparency can thus be viewed as a mechanism for true 
democratization and justice. For Tita Radilla, whose father Rosendo Radilla was 
disappeared while stopped at a checkpoint on August 25, 1974, the quest to find out 
what happened that day has been integral to justice. Radilla took her case to the 
Interamerican Human Rights Court, securing a victory against the Mexican State in 
2009.31 Radilla also founded an advocacy group, The Association of Families of 
Detained and Disappeared Victims of Human Rights Violations in Mexico (AFADEM), 
an organization that not only advocates for people affected by the Dirty War but for 
those forcibly disappeared today, either by transnational criminal organizations, the 
military, or a combination thereof. Like Radilla, the media and survivors of the Allende 
massacre understood the state would not willingly investigate the murders without 
external pressure and advocated for truth outside the state. It is within this space of 
autonomy that a clear line between the Dirty War and Allende exists.  
3.2 Democratization 
The election of Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) marked the 
official democratization of Mexico, which had operated under the relatively stable yet 
authoritarian PRI for a staggering seventy-one years. The process of democratization, 
however, began long before the election of President Fox, and is inextricably linked to 
Mexico’s rich history of opposition. During his speech on December 2, 2000, Fox 
offered a new vision, one that lived up to the ideals of Mexico’s revolutionary past, 
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declaring, “I differ radically from the old view that power is not to be shared. I will share 
power, and also the responsibilities. I am the guardian of power, not its owner.32  
Fox promised a more transparent and participatory system, one that would 
illuminate the moral failings of the past. In 2002, the president demanded the 
secretariats of the interior and the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) turn 
over all Mexican Dirty War records to the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) located 
in the infamous Lecumberri, a former Mexico City prison that had housed Mexico’s 
political prisoners from the 1950s to the 1970s.33 While the election in 2000 represents 
official democratization, an examination of the process of democratization is essential to 
understanding the framework through which resistance and activism evolved. Mexican 
systems of governance were not static entities but constantly evolving processes. The 
2000 election, therefore, can be viewed as a marker of a more equitable distribution of 
powers that are continually developing.  
 In 1977, President Jose Lopez Portillo allowed for the registration of new political 
parties, including that of the Mexican Communist Party.34 Portillo’s move was strategic; 
he wasn’t necessarily interested in democratization but sought to uphold the legitimacy 
and hegemony of the PRI, who had “looked distinctly undemocratic during the 1976 
presidential election,” when its candidate had run unopposed.35 The PRI was in a 
unique political position. Their continuing dominance was of the utmost concern, but the 
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culture of revolutionary values that permeated the society always loomed large, 
threatening to explode as it did during the Guerrero conflict and notably during the 
Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. Push the leftists too far, and the stability of the PRI would 
topple, causing economic catastrophe. What’s more, the state needed to maintain a 
facade of equity else they would be the subject of intense international criticism. Thus, 
the policy change was an optical illusion, a sweet spot of sorts, designed to ward off 
critics and “co-opt an angry and articulate leftist movement that accused the PRI of 
betraying its revolutionary roots.”36 While candidates had no hope of competing within a 
political system designed in favor of the PRI, it allowed the public a sense of inclusion, 
cracking the door of democracy, without permitting substantive change.  
The PRI deftly walked the line of political acceptability, permitting opposition 
through minute policy changes without tipping the balance of power.37 The allowance of 
oppositional inroads, while necessary for a semblance of national and international 
legitimacy, eventually gave way to oppositional power on the local level. The PRI-state 
could not hold the line forever, and parties such as the PAN slowly and methodically 
chipped away at PRI power. Although the opposition parties were “rarely allowed to win 
on an electoral playing field skewed by the PRI-state,”38 small concessions, outside 
formal electoral institutions and through informal bargaining tables, resolved 
simultaneously “in the streets and in the courtrooms,”39 ultimately benefitting opposition 
parties. Often these acts of dissent involved protracted and public battles, including sit-
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ins outside, or even inside, municipal buildings. Battles such as these often took years 
to resolve, siphoning energy from the PRI, and while they only resulted in small victories 
within local elections, the oppositional victories were still a voice for dissent and a path 
to secure information about the PRI.40 While the process of democratization was 
incremental and required years of patience and determination, Todd Eisenstadt argues 
it was an “exemplar protracted transition.”41  
 The culture of dissent, without which democratization may have looked very 
different, exists in continuity with the culture of opposition to Los Zetas. Authoritarianism 
pushed the public into the margins of governmental participation, and change required 
that they doggedly persevere in the face of injustice. The PAN victory in 2000 can be 
traced back to the 1980s. During the economic catastrophe of the 1980s, elites became 
weary of the economic stagnation, and began supporting the Partido Accion Nacional 
(PAN) in state and local elections. While Mexican presidents still selected their 
successors, in a practice known as the dedazo, business groups hoped the rightist PAN 
could force change within the local political system. Then in 1988, Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas, the son of beloved President Lazaro Cárdenas, who had been a champion of 
agrarian land reform, ran for president. When it looked like Cárdenas might win the 
election, the PRI took steps to prevent the victory. Access to the election results were 
abruptly halted “due to computer failure,”42 ballots were burned, and Carlos Salinas was 
declared president of Mexico.   
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After the election results were announced, Cárdenas contested the results, 
declaring the “government and the president of the republic offered clean elections and 
respect for the will of the people, but since July 6, the people are being trampled, the 
law is being violated, and now we are in the final phase of the consummation of an 
enormous electoral fraud.”43 During a stunning demonstration of public outrage, 
exemplifying patterns of opposition, 200,000 people marched on the National Palace to 
protest voter fraud. Citizens decried the departure from revolutionary values, with 
protest banners declaring Salinas’s economic policies had created rampant poverty, 
further marginalizing those not entrenched within the Mexican elite. Protestors argued 
the PRI and Salinas brought hunger and hardship44 rather than the promised growth. 
While Cárdenas asked his followers to exercise legal political pressure rather than 
violent opposition to uphold the election results,45 the legacy of Mexico’s revolutionary 
culture infiltrated the movement and Cárdenas supporters threatened insurrection, 
declaring revolutionary heroes like Jose Maria Morelos and Emiliano Zapata were 
sources of inspiration.46  
 With intensifying globalization and the weakening of central state power, 1994 
became a turbulent year for Mexico. It was the year NAFTA was implemented by 
President Salinas, the year PRI candidate Donaldo Colosio was assassinated, and the 
year of the Chiapas Rebellion, which rapidly caused instability. All this marked the 
beginning of the remarkable Zedillo presidency. Zedillo, an economist educated at 
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Yale,47 continued to implement neoliberal reforms begun by Salinas, declaring the 
reform process would continue even in the face of internal opposition by the PRI. During 
his inauguration speech, Zedillo criticized the corruption of the Salinas administration 
(Salinas endured the speech and criticism with stoicism), declaring the poorest 
Mexicans were not treated fairly. Zedillo committed the administration to fighting 
monopolistic practices that marginalized the majority of Mexicans.48 Ironically, 
liberalization, as discussed in Chapter 2, further marginalized the poor, but also 
contributed to PRI fragmentation. For instance, Zedillo made a concerted effort to 
appoint members of his cabinet that were poised to continue the economic reforms of 
Salinas (he appointed the chief NAFTA negotiator Herminio Blanco as the commerce 
secretary). Zedillo also appointed a member of the opposition party PAN as the attorney 
general.  
While the 1917 Mexican Constitution was far from static, decentralization of 
presidential power and changes to the Mexican Supreme did accelerate under 
President Zedillo. After the creation of the National Party (later known as the PRI) in 
1929, a monopoly of political power was centralized within the executive branch. The 
control was rooted in the PRI’s dominance over the electoral process and their control 
over Congress, the state legislatures, and state gubernatorial offices.49 The judicial 
branch, restricted by the power of presidential appointment, did not challenge 
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presidential authority and Congress was likewise beholden to the will of the presidency. 
This system of presidential control, known as the presidencialismo, was noticeably in 
decline during the presidency of Zedillo. A revised separation of powers became 
apparent when in 1997 the PRI lost control of the Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de 
Diputados). President Zedillo was still able to pass a significant amount of legislation, 
but the loss of power reflected the shift of legislative power toward Congress, and an 
overall decentralization of the executive branch.50  
The anti-corruption agenda was an important component of the Zedillo 
Administration’s agenda. In a bold move, the new president asked for the resignation of 
all 26 Supreme Court justices. Zedillo, through his anti-corruption policies, liberalization, 
and election finance laws, accelerated the process of democratization, resulting in 
fractures within the political and social fabric of Mexico. Zedillo made a final striking 
move at the end of his presidency by publicly congratulating Fox on his electoral victory, 
ensuring a smooth transition of power and the democratization of Mexico. Years of 
entrenched alliances were slowly and methodically losing power, the consequences of 
which were manifested in groups such as Los Zetas. The authoritarian system had been 
oppressive but relatively stable, using targeted coercion to secure power.  
Ultimately, the process of democratization, along with a longstanding culture of 
impunity and the aggressive policies of President Calderón starting in 2006, would 
facilitate Los Zetas’ detachment from traditional systems of order that had been stable 
under authoritarianism. This detachment would have dire consequences for the people 
of Tamaulipas and Coahuila—migrants and media alike. The process of 
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democratization also provided a small space for the public to access systems of 
governance, as seen during the opening of the Dirty War records in 2002. While there 
was an increased space for access and participation, the culture of impunity, as 
witnessed in Allende, remained firmly entrenched within local systems of governance. 
After the Allende massacre, the public expected the state to conceal crimes from the 
public and shirk the responsibility of an investigation. Local police had after all 
participated in the crimes, blurring the line between legitimate and illegitimate actors.  
When considering the dramatic increase in crime following the period of 
democratization, questions naturally arise. For instance, what connection exists 
between democratization and criminality? The decentralization of executive power and 
the ultimate triumph of democratization did not solve deeper issues concerning public 
faith in the electoral process. The PRI’s long history of electoral fraud undermined the 
legitimacy of state institutions, creating uncertainty within the public sphere. This 
instability and uncertainty motivated criminal organizations to expand operations and fill 
vacuums of power. Sociologist Andrés Villarreal examines increases in violent crime 
during the democratic transition, arguing homicide rates increased among municipalities 
with greater electoral competition. The increased violence, Villarreal argues, is due in 
part to disruptions within patronage networks.51 This disruption to patronage networks 
becomes especially apparent in more rural areas where such hierarchical networks are 
more entrenched, leading to a loss of social and political control. In Allende, former 
systems of social and political control were replaced by Los Zetas’ unique brand of 
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criminality. The group integrated themselves within social structures of order and 
cohesion. Los Zetas purchased businesses, married into local families, and coerced the 
local labor force to support their operations. Top leaders Miguel Treviño Morales and his 
brother Omar even made Allende their home. Ultimately the process of integration by 
Los Zetas coupled with DEA operational indiscretion and Mexican security leaks 
created an environment where Los Zetas could operate with impunity. 
3.3 A Case for Impunity 
 The fractures within the justice system, lack of a cohesive system of 
accountability, and endemic poverty within police forces contributed to increased law 
enforcement collaboration with criminal organizations. In Nuevo Laredo alone, it has 
been estimated that during the height of Los Zetas’ power approximately “90 percent of 
the municipal police were allegedly on Los Zetas’ payroll.”52 As employees of the 
organization, the police were directed to alert Los Zetas when unauthorized groups 
were moving commodities through their territory and when rival organizations or the 
military were conducting operations in the region. Los Zetas also directed law 
enforcement personnel to secure safe houses.53  
According to a special report by Michael Evans of the National Security Archive, 
the military received multiple reports about the violence in Allende. On March 20, 2011, 
the army sent a patrol to the Garza Ranch after a man reported the disappearance of 
multiple family members. The soldiers “found doors torn off, the building sacked, spent 
shell casings, dead animals, burned buildings, and a pick-up truck riddled with bullets, 
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but no people.”54 The reasons the army was reluctant to investigate further is unknown 
but illustrates the absence of state order in the region. The military’s reluctance to 
investigate not only left evidence unsecured but directly affected people like Elvira 
Espinoza who reported three of her grandchildren as disappeared from Allende. She 
found two of her grandchildren at an orphanage a week after their disappearance. Later 
Espinoza discovered the two young children and their infant brother had been 
separated from their parents and held for days. The two older children were then 
dropped off at a park. The baby, Mauricio, was too little to be left at the park, Los Zetas 
told the older children, he cried too much. Los Zetas then separated baby Mauricio from 
the older children. He has not been seen since.55  
While there are unanswered questions regarding the reluctance of the military to 
investigate further, there is direct testimony connecting the local police to the crimes.  
Christian Alejandro Lopez Tamez, the Allende fire chief, identified officials from the 
Allende police department who were connected to the massacre during his testimony on 
December 17, 2014.56 “When I saw all those police I realized that they were keeping 
watch or guarding the place, that is to say the ranch.”57 Lopez adds he spent a lot of 
time with police in what was after all a small town, and he can therefore positively 
identify its members. Before condemning the police department, it is important to 
remember city officials were in an impossible position. If they refused to cooperate with 
Los Zetas or refused payments they were given for their cooperation, they put their lives 
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and the lives of their family at risk. Similarly, journalists who were paid to kill stories or 
not investigate certain crimes did so not necessarily out of adherence to the authority of 
Los Zetas but because to do otherwise would immediately endanger lives.  
Events such as those in Allende are often viewed as the result of Mexican 
corruption and seen as inevitable in the region, but Allende also raises significant issues 
relating to the role of U.S. intelligence when interacting with Mexican security forces. 
Allende is approximately 40 minutes from the border and remains inextricably connected 
to the United States, recalling the fluidity of North America during globalization. U.S. 
intelligence, therefore, has a responsibility to the citizens of Mexico to ensure their safety. 
The fact that the U.S. frivolously shared information with Mexican security forces when 
they had been explicitly warned that sharing information could result in violence is 
problematic, but it also speaks to the need for international solutions. Human rights 
violations are not Mexico’s “problem” but the problem of everyone concerned with the civil 
and political rights of all human beings. Allende illuminates the international responsibility 
of all nations to ensure global safety.  
Like the police and journalists, mayors and other city officials often had to make 
difficult choices when encountering criminal organizations. Mauricio Fernandez, who 
served as the mayor of San Pedro Garza, details the infiltration of criminal organizations 
into state systems and their use of irregular warfare, claiming “I hear about events 
occurring—through mayors, through friends of mine with cattle ranches, through people 
who say: ‘Well, they came, and landed in helicopters, and killed everyone.”58 On his 
friend’s ranch, he asserts, “helicopters came in and basically massacred everyone.”59 
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Much of the violence against public officials did not result in formal investigations, and 
the search for truth was often left to journalists and activists. While it’s easy to blame 
mayors or police who turned a blind eye to violence, without the support of the military, 
and with copious intelligence leaks, ethical governance verges on impossible.  
In August of 2010, Edelmiro Cavazos, the mayor of Santiago, Nuevo Leon, was 
at his home when he noticed an approaching convoy. Wanting to know the nature of the 
visit, Cavazos and his bodyguard approached the group. Both Cavazos and his 
bodyguard were then kidnapped “by at least 15 gunman wearing uniforms of a defunct 
police agency who arrived in a convoy of sport-utility vehicles, with patrol lights 
flashing.”60 While the bodyguard was later released, and still later found to be complicit 
in the crime, Cavazos’s “bound, blindfolded body was found dumped alongside a rural 
road.”61 It was hypothesized by Nuevo Leon Governor Rodrigo Medina that the 
execution was in retaliation for anti-corruption efforts made by the 38-eight-year-old 
Cavazos. State Attorney General of Nuevo Leon Alejandro Garza y Garza reported 
police officers, who were arrested in connection to the slaying, “admitted they worked 
for the Zetas as lookouts.”62 The killing had been ordered by a Zeta leader, reportedly 
Angel Virgilio Avila Sanchez, known as El Vampiro,63 after the police officers/zeta 
operatives complained the mayor had disciplined them (he apparently initiated pay cuts 
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and other disciplinary measures after Cavazos discovered the officers were wrongfully 
issuing citations to mountain bikers), leading them to assume Cavazos worked for a 
rival criminal organization.  
In 2010, approximately fifteen mayors were executed by criminal organizations in 
Mexico.64 Often there was collaboration between municipal police forces and criminal 
organizations. The executions and the duplicity of police forces illuminates the fluidity 
between state and non-state actors during this time as well as the legacy of 
militarization and governmental impunity. Los Zetas, considering their military culture, 
were well-suited to form an alliance with police forces. Mayor Mauricio Fernandez spoke 
with Cavazos before his death. Cavazos reportedly said he “received a “threatening visit 
from traffickers shortly after taking office.”65 Fernandez urged Cavazos to call in the 
army, remembering “he was frightened and had found a municipal government 
enormously in cahoots with organized crime.”66 The surge in mayoral murders can be 
viewed as a challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence, but the continuity between 
authoritarianism and militarization also becomes apparent, inevitably breeding impunity. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, “the police did not merely secure the state in the face of 
citizen mobilization and political challenge; they also became part of the problem.”67 The 
fragmentation of police forces bred “conflict and competition,” and issues of 
accountability. In the case of municipalities occupied by Los Zetas, the alliance between 
the local police and Zetas presented an impossible situation for mayors and other public 
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officials as the fluidity between state and non-state actors often made opposition a 
choice between life and death.  
3.4 Media Resistance 
 In 2011, Los Zetas became very concerned with social media. Media may have 
been disrupting operations due to real-time reporting. Activist bloggers were known to 
broadcast interactive maps “which logged where drugs were sold, stash houses were 
based and where the halcones” stood watch,68 but more than that, bloggers openly 
questioned Zeta authority. This period can be characterized as the height of Zeta 
violence, especially in relation to the public, and this escalation correlates to intensified 
media opposition. As the state’s failure to ensure public safety became apparent, the 
public filled the void of state weakness to uphold order. The fall of 2011 was marked by 
the murders of multiple bloggers who publicly denounced the Zeta occupation of Nuevo 
Laredo.  
First, on September 13, two social media activists “were found hanging from a 
bridge.”69 There were signs found with the bodies that read, “this will happen to all 
internet snitches,” putting Frontera al Rojo Vivo, Blog del Narco, and Denuncia 
Ciudadano on notice.70 Then on September 24, Maria Elizabeth Macias, the editor of 
Nuevo Laredo newspaper Primera Hora and a blogger for Nuevo Laredo en Vivo 
(NLV),71 was found decapitated in Nuevo Laredo. Known as “La Nena Laredo,” or the 
Girl of Laredo, the editor’s head was placed on La Glorieta de Colon, a Christopher 
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Columbus monument in Nuevo Laredo, with a message: “’Ok Nuevo Laredo en Vivo 
and social media sites. I am Nena de Laredo and I’m here because of my actions, for 
trusting the army and the navy…Thank you for your attention,”72 signed ZZZ. A few 
months later, A second blogger at NLV, a 35-year-old male known as “El Rascatripas,73 
was tortured, decapitated, and dumped, like Macias, near La Glorieta de Colon, with a 
sign: “Hi I’m Rascatripas and this happened to me because I didn’t understand I 
shouldn’t post things on social networks.”74 
The ability of Los Zetas to track media users has been attributed to informants or 
possibly cybersecurity experts. Either way, the acts of violence are indicative of Los 
Zetas’ technological adeptness and their media savvy. The messaging backfired, 
however, unleashing even more national and international outrage. Viewed through the 
theoretical framework of Franco, the bodies of Macias, El Rascatripas, and the 2 other 
activists, are clearly intended to be expressions of Zeta power, warning opponents 
about the consequences of resistance. The question is, who sent the message? Los 
Zetas? Macias? There is dual messaging at play, depending on the perspective. The 
expression of the body is an interaction between sender and receiver, a negotiation. 
While intended to be a form of coercive power, the more dominant message remains 
the power of activists to exact change.  
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On August 22, 2010, Ecuadoran Luis Fredy Lala Pomavilla, and “approximately 
75 migrants from Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil, and Ecuador,”75 were traveling in panel 
trucks along the highway between Ciudad Victoria and San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in 
an effort to reach the U.S. border. As they neared the U.S. border, approximately ninety 
miles from Brownsville, Texas, they were stopped by armed Zetas and transported to a 
ranch in San Fernando. Once at the compound, Los Zetas offered the kidnapped 
migrants the opportunity to work for the organization. The men were offered work as 
sicarios and the women were offered work as cooks. They could earn good money, 
more than they could hope to earn through legitimate work, a staggering $500 per 
week.76  
Lala remembers the refusals uttered that night. All but one of the men and 
women who had made the arduous journey from Central America, who were almost 
there, almost, refused to work for Los Zetas. Their refusal to work for the organization 
was not well-received, and every member of the group who refused, except for one 
female and one child who were separated from the rest, was escorted to a nearby 
warehouse, bound and blindfolded, and shot in the back of the head. In total, fifty-eight 
men and fourteen women were executed that day. Lala passed out after being shot in 
the jaw. According to Lala’s testimony, he miraculously awoke hours later and found 
everyone dead except for one Salvadoran male. Lala and the unidentified Salvadoran 
then fled the ranch in different directions, searching for help. Lala indicated he “heard 
 
75  US Consulate Matamoros, Los Zetas Massacre. 
76 Intelligence questions what they consider to be a generous salary and asserts the pay would 
have been much lower and they may have entered a form of indentured servitude. See US 
Consulate Matamoros, Los Zetas Massacre.  
 
 62 
trucks pursuing the other survivor and later heard gun shots, which led him to believe 
that the Salvadoran had been caught and executed.”77  
When Lala asked people in the area for assistance (in one account Lala asked 
the police for help, and during another interview, Lala asked occupants in a house near 
the Zeta compound), they refused, and so he continued to walk through the night. 
During the “early morning hours of Monday, August 23”78 Lala approached a Mexican 
Navy checkpoint near San Fernando, Mexico, where he finally found help. Based on 
Lala’s information, the Mexican Navy began searching for the site of the massacre, and 
then came into contact with Zetas at a nearby ranch. A gun battle ensued, leaving a 
marine and three Zetas dead. On Tuesday, August 24, at around 6 p.m., the military 
found the executed migrants. They had been piled up against the wall of a warehouse. 
On August 30, Lala returned to Ecuador, refusing to stay in Mexico even after the GOM 
offered the eighteen-year-old a humanitarian visa.79 
 Motivations for this crime have long been under investigation, and the answers 
remain unclear. Security analysts find it unconvincing that Los Zetas were motivated by 
a need to recruit new members.80 It also seems questionable that Los Zetas mistakenly 
identified the migrants as members of another criminal organization. They were travel 
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worn and from Central America, and Los Zetas would not have linked them to rivals. 
There has been speculation that the profits for smuggling the migrants were to be paid 
to the CDG, who were in an ongoing conflict with Los Zetas, but even this explanation is 
questionable considering the extreme nature of the crimes. That said, Los Zetas are 
known for such extremities and so the explanation cannot be ruled out.  
The migrant massacre marked the beginning of a string of violent events that 
occurred in Tamaulipas between August 22-27, 2010:81  
• On August 24, two Secretaría de la Defensa (SEDENA) and four members of 
Los Zetas were killed during an altercation in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. It was 
reported that Los Zetas utilized advanced weaponry including an RPG and the 
situation was so volatile that the public was advised to stay indoors for safety.  
• On August 24, two blocks from the U.S. Consulate, a grenade was detonated 
near the Matamoros City Water Offices. The attack was near the B&M 
International Bridge and resulted in the closure of lanes heading into Mexico.  
• On August 25, Roberto Jaime Suarez Vasquez, who was the San Fernando 
State Prosecutor, and Juan Carlos Sanchez Suarez, who was the San Fernando 
Municipal Police Director, were reported missing after investigating the 
Tamaulipas Massacre on August 24. 
• On August 27, another grenade was thrown at the Department of Public Safety in 
the city of Valle Hermoso. The building was damaged during the attack, but no 
injuries occurred.  
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• On August 27, a car bomb was detonated in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, 
outside of the Mexican Televisa station. The station’s towers were damaged, 
causing the station to discontinue broadcasting. 
• On August 27, another car bomb was detonated in Ciudad Victoria near the 
transit police.82  
While Zeta operations in 2010 and 2011 are a clear challenge to state authority, the 
period is also marked by popular opposition that correlates to the overall decline of the 
organization. As discussed in Chapter 2, indiscriminate violence was a crucial component 
to Zeta branding, but the events of Allende and Tamaulipas solidified a foundation of 
opposition that Los Zetas could not effectively combat. After the well-publicized human 
rights violations, law enforcement intensified efforts to capture Zeta leaders and on the 
morning of July 13, 2013, Miguel Treviño, or Z-40, was captured by Mexican Marines in 
Anahuac, near Nuevo Laredo.83 Activism and the sacrifice of mayors, journalists, 
migrants, and many others can be viewed as integral to the decline of Los Zetas. As Lucio 
Cabañas became an inspiration for leftist revolutionaries, the people impacted by Los 
Zetas’ violence became an inspiration for activists. By examining resistance to Los Zetas, 
we find the opposition was deeply rooted in not only a culture of impunity but a confluence 
of historical contexts, including the process of democratization and the Mexican Dirty War. 
The intensity of violence during this period can be linked to the Calderon presidency, of 
course, but historical connections go still deeper, and the fight for transparency and 
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justice assumes an equal role in the conflict. The deaths of journalists in Nuevo Laredo, 
the executions of the 72 migrants in San Fernando, and countless others, should 








Neoliberalism and Criminality 
 
 During the 1990s, economists and policymakers proselytized the benefits of a 
less regulated market economy, viewing the formula known as the Washington 
Consensus as an elixir guaranteed to facilitate unlimited growth.1 Many leading 
advocates of the Consensus thought there was a role for government in creating 
frameworks to facilitate globalization, but there was nevertheless a marked shift to 
deregulation and privatization.2 In short, advocates of neoliberalism thought the 
government should “simply get out of the way and let the markets do their work.”3  
While many now vilify globalization as a harbinger of poverty and death in the 
developing world, the costs and benefits of triumphalist capitalism transcend such 
narratives. Economist Joseph Stiglitz, while a critic of globalization, argues reduced 
barriers for international trade allowed many countries a faster path to development, 
including Asia where millions were better off with export-led growth policies.4 
Additionally, globalization brought a sense of connectivity, combatting the economic and 
social alienation many people felt throughout the developing world.  
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collaboration between private sectors and ejido communities. See Amy L. Luers, Naylor, 
Rosamond L Naylor, and Pamela A. Matson, “A Case Study of Land Reform and Coastal Land 
Transformation in Southern Sonora, Mexico,” Land Use Policy 23, no. 4 (October 2006): 437. 
3 Massey, Of Myths and Markets, 8.  




The interconnectedness simultaneously facilitated an increased access to knowledge 
and resources that were not previously within reach.  
While globalization brought increased connectivity throughout the world, it has 
also been a hegemonic force of the elite,5 creating a space for a select few, including 
educational institutions, the media, and private capital to curate world discourse and 
accumulate wealth. Neoliberalism did create an aspirational zone within developing 
countries, in which barriers for growth were seemingly demolished, yet questions linger 
as to the long-term effects of such economic policies. Critics of liberalization claim the 
promised growth was a façade, masking the true purpose of globalization, that of 
subjugation and exploitation. This chapter will look at neoliberalism in relation to Los 
Zetas to examine how reforms have infiltrated the public and private sphere, 
comprehensively dividing and reorienting values and social systems.  
Los Zetas have benefitted from globalization and from the restructuring of 
national frameworks and hierarchies, but how has the organization become an object of 
a neoliberal agenda? While this thesis does not claim that there is collusion between 
TCOs and transnational corporations, it does examine the paradoxical alignment 
between the two zones of operation. Los Zetas have clearly contributed to the 
destabilization of Mexico, facilitating socioeconomic schisms throughout their regions of 
operation. Their zones of interference have not been arbitrary, however, and have 
occurred in areas that are extremely rich in undeveloped natural resources. While Los 
Zetas did not consciously collaborate with the state and corporations to destabilize the 
 
5 David Harvey, "Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction," The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 610 (2007): 23. 
 
 68 
region, the instability they wrought did make space for private investment. Los Zetas 
can therefore be viewed as agents of neoliberalism and a force of social change.  
4.1 Economic Transition  
 Prior to the 1980s, Latin American economic policy was dominated by import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), in which the state facilitated economic development 
and growth, investing in projects such as railways, seaports, and refineries, to promote 
capital accumulation.6 Under this system, the state is the agent of change and the 
markets support the mandates of the state through their development. Political scientist 
Wendy Brown describes the process of neoliberal reform as transmogrifying “every 
human domain and endeavor, along with humans themselves, according to a specific 
image of the economic.”7 If modernity can be understood in part as a process of 
substitution whereby science, reason, and centrally organized governments replace 
monarchical allegiance and religious morality, neoliberalism can similarly be viewed as 
a framework that elevates the market economy to the new primary point of allegiance.  
The neoliberal transition is a significant factor in the evolution of Los Zetas in that 
the restructuring of economic policy and state apparatus not only created economic 
insecurity for large portions of the population but fractured social groups and traditions. 
In his wildly successful 1999 monograph The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Pulitzer Prize 
winning author Thomas Friedman argued globalization, “a new, very greased, 
interconnected system,”8 would not fracture systems but would allow us to connect the 
 
6 Massey, Of Myths and Markets, 9.  
7 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution (Brooklyn: Zone 
Books, 2015), 10. 




dots and vanquish chaos. This new system would demolish the walls between 
“countries, markets and disciplines”9 and increase efficiency. In short, globalization had 
more benefits than drawbacks. Like Modernization Theory, in which there is a single 
path to progress, globalization would homogenize the international systems to propel us 
to a universal order. For Latin America, this order is inherently undemocratic not only 
because it has been mandated by the U.S., but also because its structural design 
creates an uneven landscape for growth. Thus, globalization became a structural force 
of violence.  
ISI helped facilitate growth following WWII, and from 1945-1975 the Mexican 
Miracle was largely viewed as a success story. The downside to ISI, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, was the growing economic marginalization in states such as Guerrero. After 
increasing economic stagnation during the 1970s and the immense growth of social 
movements throughout Latin America, the U.S. treasury and lending institutions 
“persuaded” Mexico to deconstruct more centralized state systems that were developed 
under ISI and implement reforms that fell within the framework of the Washington 
Consensus. The restructuring included the dismantlement of bureaucracies and the 
deregulation and privatization of industries. Neoliberal policies, and the shift toward a 
market driven state, both facilitated increased rates of socioeconomic inequality and an 
unequal access to resources, including clean water, healthy foods, and quality 
education, thereby creating barriers to upward mobility.  
By 2003, income inequality was high, with the poorest one-tenth of Latin 
American families earning 1.6 percent of the total income. The wealthiest families in 
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Latin America, on the other hand, earned 48 percent of total income.10 With dramatically 
reduced opportunities and the inability to compete with transnational corporations in the 
formal economic sector, workers fled to the informal sector, and by the end of the 
1990s, 40 percent of workers in Mexico earned a living through informal means.11 Data 
from the United Nations indicates that 70 percent of jobs created in Latin America 
between 1990 and 1997 were in the informal sector, and by 2000, 59 percent of urban 
work was also informal, a 19 percent jump from 1980.12 The structural links between 
formal and informal sectors under liberalization created more opportunities for criminal 
organizations to expand, forcing informal sectors to continually interact with criminal 
actors for basic needs.  
Under neoliberalism, the concept of an informal economic sector became an 
opaque reality, with formal organizations exploiting the informal sectors to increase 
profits. With reduced rates of pay and long hours, the sector was extraordinarily 
valuable to private industry as well as private citizens of higher socioeconomic classes. 
During the 1990s, for instance, informal sectors often supplied formal organizations with 
products and services at a discounted rate. In short, the increasing poverty and 
exclusion became a method to increase surplus value without fairly compensating the 
source. Additionally, the fluidity between the formal and informal spheres made it 
challenging to determine the origins of products and services and whether goods were 
 
10 Magaly Sanchez, “Insecurity and Violence as a New Power Relation in Latin America,” in 
Chronicle of a Myth Foretold: The Washington Consensus in Latin America (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE publications, 2006), 181. 
11 Sanchez, “Insecurity and Violence,” 181. 
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produced ethically. Put within the context of the economic stagnation of the 1970s, and 
liberalization becomes a path for transferring wealth back to the ruling class.  
4.2 Structural Exclusion and Violence 
In 2001, the media reported on the severe mistreatment of a 12-year-maid who 
was held in abhorrent conditions by Sandra Beardon, of Laredo, Texas.13 When the 
police found the girl, she was covered in cuts and bruises and sent to the intensive care 
unit, where she received treatment for dehydration as well as skin and eye infections. 
When she was not fulfilling her duties as a maid, the girl was chained to a pole in the 
Beardons’ backyard, and had police not discovered her, doctors insist she would not 
have survived another week.14 During the trial, it was reported that Mrs. Beardon had 
forced the girl to eat dog feces, sleep outside, and had sexually assaulted her by 
inserting a tool into her private parts.15 Mrs. Beardon’s sadistic tendencies also included 
breaking a broom over the girl’s back, hitting her over the head with a glass bottle, and 
spraying her in the face with red pepper if she didn’t think the child was performing her 
chores to standard.16 It was later discovered that seven months previously Mrs. 
Beardon had traveled to an impoverished village in Veracruz where she had persuaded 
the child’s parents to allow the girl to migrate to the United States where she would 
have more opportunities. Beardon then smuggled the girl across the McAllen, Texas 
border, finally taking the child back to her home in Laredo.  
 
13 “Police: Woman Chained 12-Year-Old Maid to Backyard Pole,” CNN, May 14, 2001, accessed 
on April 21, 2021, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/05/14/chained.girl/. 
14 “Police: Woman Chained 12-Year-Old Maid.”  
15 Michael J. Pisani and David W. Yoskowitz, "The Maid Trade: Cross-Border Work in South 
Texas," Social Science Quarterly 83, no. 2 (June 2002): 568. 
16 Pisani and Yoskowitz, “The Maid Trade,” 569. 
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The Beardon case exemplifies the experiences of one family that arose within the 
confines of socioeconomic marginalization, but the communal experience of alienation 
and subjugation, over time, can translate to a culture of violence. Children, for instance, 
are often born without birth certificates and exist without access to state services. 
Persons within these spheres move outside the order of state structures but are 
nevertheless expected to adhere to its mandates. It is thus, as Magaly Sanchez has 
explained, that “under conditions of prolonged informality and illegality, and without 
official documentation, the structural violence of neoliberalism produced new 
expressions of violence.”17 There is a sphere of invisibility that surrounds concentrated 
areas of poverty, and without official status or the means to gain status or visibility, 
autonomy can be affected for life. 
Los Zetas are a magnification of this structural effect, manifesting in unique 
forms. Despite their uniqueness, they are nevertheless connected to the structural 
violence of liberalization, both in terms of their organizational capabilities, including their 
migrant trafficking monopolization, and in terms of their evolution. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Guzmán and Lazcano, Z-1 and Z-3 respectively, both came from military 
backgrounds while Miguel Treviño Morales, Z-40, considered by many to be the most 
violent Zeta, did not have any military training. Instead, Z-40 was the product of border 
culture. It is in Texas, not Mexico, United States investigators claim, that Treviño 
Morales, the teenager, was transformed into Z-40, the violent criminal.  
According to detective Roberto García, Treviño Morales preyed upon teenagers 
in Texas, recruiting young people who came from socioeconomic backgrounds similar 
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to his own. Police reports indicate a new generation of Zetas were operating in the 
Dallas area, and unlike their predecessors, the new generation was better assimilated 
within the region and therefore more difficult for law enforcement to identify. As products 
of both American culture and bias, and motivated by the desire for class mobility, their 
appearance solidifies the connection between the United States and Los Zetas 
throughout the group’s evolution.  
The undercover detective who raised the alarm about Los Zetas operational 
capacity in Texas, claims, “I wasn’t trying to make anybody panic,” but the fact was Los 
Zetas were expanding and recruiting in Texas. The city, afraid the report would scare 
away investors, dismissed the findings and refused to take action. The detective admits 
the police were not proactive in stopping Zeta recruitment and operations in Texas and 
questions whether more robust interventions could have prevented violence in Mexico, 
musing, “maybe had we been more engaged, things could have turned out differently.”18 
While it is problematic to engage in counterfactual history, there remains a clear 
connection between Los Zetas and the United States, both in terms of militarization and 
socioeconomic alienation within border zones. Minimally, the connection challenges the 
idea that TCO violence, including the massacres in Tamaulipas and Allende, are 
exclusive products of Mexican society. Beyond this, it illustrates the effects of intimate 
border relations as well as the relegation of Brown bodies to zones of informality, 
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4.3 Oil in Tamaulipas  
 The state of Tamaulipas has been central to Zeta operations, resulting in 
escalating violence and instability throughout the region. It is also, coincidentally or not, 
a strategic geographic location for the energy sector, with significant oil and gas 
deposits located in or near the state, particularly in the Burgos Basin, Tampico-Misantla, 
and in the Gulf of Mexico.19 Furthermore, the energy resources identified have been 
largely undeveloped and therefore are potentially lucrative for investors. For instance, in 
2010, while there were 11,000 explored deposits in Tamaulipas, there were only 1,900 
that were operational,20 and in 2014, the government of Tamaulipas estimated that 
approximately 65 percent of the 52.6 thousand million barrels of crude oil that had been 
identified by Pemex as a prospective resource was in Tamaulipas.21   
After NAFTA was enacted in 1994, transnational corporations were allowed more 
operational capacity in the region. As a result, private companies such as Halliburton, 
Delta, and Schlumberger were able to work as contractors for Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX). The transition to private investment in the region intensified during the 
succeeding years, and in 2017, a few years after the peak in violence, most notably in 
2011, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) disclosed Mexico’s Secretariat 
of Energy, or SENER, would begin allowing private companies to explore and develop 
the Burgos Basin for natural gas.22 Since the creation of PEMEX, energy exploration 
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has been limited to state agents and the reform marks a notable policy shift with 
significant consequences for the region.  
Even though shale deposits in the basin are the most undeveloped in the 
country, recent years have seen a decrease in PEMEX production.23 In 2012, for 
instance, PEMEX invested $657 million on exploration and production in the region. By 
2017, PEMEX had reduced its investment in the Burgos Basin to $51 million, down 
92%.24 While there are challenges to production in the basin, including low permeability, 
in which the oil or gas cannot move quickly through the rock, requiring additional 
pressure for efficient resource extraction, the increased investment by private 
companies indicates there is substantial value in the region.  
 Considering many of the most violent zones in Mexico, including Tamaulipas, 
Coahuila, the Juárez Valley, and Michoacán, are also extremely rich in energy 
resources, questions of correlation and motivation naturally arise. Motivations for Los 
Zetas occur on multiple levels and are consistently connected to neoliberal reforms and 
ethos. Specifically, and most glaringly, increased exclusion from upward social mobility 
sparked desire among expanding portions of the population, including those living along 
border zones, to expand wealth through criminal means. This is especially apparent 
when examining the youth recruitment by Z-40 in Dallas, Texas. While the desire for 
wealth is not a new phenomenon, the expanding interaction between criminal groups 
and populations living within informal zones has significantly increased the opportunity 
for TCOs to diversify operations.  
 
23 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Mexico’s Shale-Rich Burgos. 
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Beyond the desire for mobility, the reconfiguration of state and social structures 
under the neoliberal transition can be viewed as a significant factor in Los Zetas’ 
development, especially their expansion into migrant trafficking. According to David 
Harvey, dispossession is crucial to the expansion of capital,25 and acts as a key method 
for the redistribution of wealth. In Mexico, there is a marked pattern whereby surges in 
violence consistently occur in energy-rich regions. While it is not the intention of Los 
Zetas to create instability and dispossess people of land so private investors can 
develop Tamaulipas, they nevertheless serve the interests of such investors, who 
opportunistically seek out societal fractures in the name of progress. In 2017, 
BNamericas, an investment tool that focuses on Latin America, declared the state of 
Tamaulipas was poised to become a “major energy hub” in the coming years.26 With 
Tamaulipas expected to receive more than $32 billion in exploration and development 
contracts, and with the state governor, Francisco García Cabeza de Vaca meeting with 
Texas officials to shore up energy and infrastructure ties, the state that was home to 
some of the worst massacres in Mexico’s history is well-positioned to be a windfall for 
energy investors.   
4.4 Instability in Tamaulipas 
Between 2006 and 2015, Tamaulipas was marked by instability, and reported a 
total of 5,720 disappeared, the highest in the nation. The region was also the location of 
a large number of mass grave sites, for which Los Zetas were responsible. On April 6, 
2011, the U.S. Consulate in Matamoros reported SEDENA had discovered two mass 
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graves containing 48 bodies near San Fernando in Tamaulipas.27 Many of the bodies, 
two of which were wearing police uniforms, were in advanced stages of decomposition 
while others appeared to have died within the last seven to ten days.28 The varying 
degrees of decomposition indicates Los Zetas had been disposing of bodies in these 
mass graves for a considerable period of time, and that it was standard operating 
procedure rather than a unique event.  
Then on April 8, 2011, the U.S. Consulate in Matamoros reported the discovery 
of additional mass graves near San Fernando. Mexican federal officials said they had 
discovered a total of 81 bodies in 17 burial sites and believed that the majority of the 
bodies belonged to people that were kidnapped from public buses that had run through 
San Fernando.29 The investigation came as a result of information that was obtained 
from kidnapping victims and arrested members of Los Zetas, and resulted in the arrest 
of seventeen Zetas and sixteen members of the San Fernando Police Department.30  
At the conclusion of the SEDENA investigation, which took place between April 1-14, 
2011, Mexican officials reported they had discovered a total of 145 bodies spread out 
over 36 gravesites.31 Off the record, Mexican officials indicated the bodies were spread 
amongst different gravesites to make the massacres appear less alarming to the public.  
 
27 U.S. Consulate Matamoros, Two Mass Graves Containing 48 Bodies Discovered in the San 
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The consulate report also indicates the Tamaulipas bus companies did not 
officially report the attacks on the line or any subsequent kidnappings. Certain bus lines 
did modify their routes through San Fernando and avoided nighttime travel, but other 
companies made no modifications. For instance, of the five bus lines that ran through 
the area, two, Omnibus and ETN, discontinued their Matamoros-Ciudad Victoria routes, 
Senda only offered the route during the day, and Transpais and Grupo Estrella Blanca 
continued to run their normal schedules, including trips that were scheduled at night. 
State officials were apparently concerned reports about the region’s security issues 
would have a negative impact on tourism, specifically tourism during the holy week 
vacation period.32  
According to the testimony of Alvaro Alba Terrazaz, a police officer detained in 
connection with the kidnappings, both police and transit officials assisted Los Zetas, 
turning persons of interest over to the TCO. In effect, there was a sophisticated network 
of informants and active criminal participants embedded within both the transit system 
and the municipal police to uphold the authority of Los Zetas in Tamaulipas.  
The negligence and collusion of transit companies illustrates the widespread infiltration 
of Los Zetas within transit infrastructure, but it also reflects the overall prioritization of 
profit over human life. This is not a new phenomenon, yet the prioritization of capital 
coupled with the indiscriminate violence of TCOs in Tamaulipas does elevate the 
intensity of such prioritizations. While cancelling routes altogether may have further 
decreased the mobility of the residents in Tamaulipas, the complete lack of official 
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reporting, and the non-modification of bus routes, elevates the ethical negligence of the 
companies, reflecting the internalization of broader neoliberal constructs.  
Motivation for the bus attacks was revealed through the testimony of Zeta Edgar 
Huerta Montiel, who told authorities members were ordered by Heriberto Lazcano 
Lazcano, Z-3, to screen incoming buses, especially those coming from Michoacán, for 
reinforcements for the CDG, whom Los Zetas were actively engaged in a conflict. 
According to Montiel, Los Zetas would intercept buses and scan passengers’ cell 
phones for evidence that connected them to the CDG. Montiel recounted the process 
for screening, saying, “Every day a bus would come, and every day we would pull the 
people off and investigate them.”33 Once the passengers were adequately vetted, “those 
that had nothing to do with it were freed, and those that did were killed.”34 While at first 
the kidnappings appeared to be the direct result of the conflict between Los Zetas and 
the CDG, which remains questionable considering Los Zetas have a history of killing 
indiscriminately, closer examination reveal additional factors at work.  
The crimes and rapidly declining security can be viewed as an integral catalyst 
for land dispossession. By initiating terror, division, and spaces of silence, whereby the 
media, state officials, and the public are fearful of reporting criminal acts, Los Zetas 
were able to destroy state infrastructure and social systems in their areas of operation. 
Instead of disavowing such acts of violence, media and officials that do report on 
crimes, often attempt to divert attention away from violent acts by framing the victims as 
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partially responsible, either by indicating they were involved in criminal activities or by 
implying they were engaged in dangerous activities such as migration. It is thus through 
destruction that private investment is able to expand its development of regions rich in 
resources, such as Tamaulipas.  
In Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein names “orchestrated raids on the public sphere 
in the wake of catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting 
market opportunities, ‘disaster capitalism,’”35 arguing the free market is dependent on 
shock to transfer immense amounts of wealth to the elite. Klein uses Hurricane Katrina 
to illustrate the methods used by elites to exploit tragedy for the expansion of wealth. 
After the hurricane, Klein recalls how a Republican congressman from New Orleans, 
Richard Baker, touted the benefits of the natural disaster, telling lobbyists, “We finally 
cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did it.”36 He 
wasn’t alone. Joseph Canizaro, a wealthy developer in the region, expressed similar 
elation about the displacement of residents, saying, “I think we have a clean sheet to 
start again. And with that clean sheet we have some very big opportunities.”37 One of 
the “opportunities” that arose from the disaster came from the rapid privatization of the 
school system, in which the vast majority of the public schools were converted into 
privately run charter schools, all while the city’s marginalized communities were exiled 
from their homes.  
New Orleans is not Tamaulipas, yet they, and other shocks to the system, share 
striking similarities. Harvey argues that accumulation by dispossession can be achieved 
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through the forceful expulsion of peasants, the conversion of property rights, from 
communal to private, for instance, and through the appropriation of natural resources.38 
In Tamaulipas, these forms of neoliberal resource appropriation have clearly been 
facilitated by Los Zetas’ unique use of violence. Katrina was a “natural” disaster, viewed 
by capitalists as a cleansing, forcing deregulation and enabling opportunists to flourish. 
Similarly, Los Zetas can be viewed as a natural occurrence whose evolution is the 
logical conclusion to militarization, democratization, and liberalization. Under 
neoliberalism, they are akin to soldiers, clearing the space that was previously held by 
the communities of Tamaulipas, and indirectly filling the emptiness with transnational 
capital. 
4.5 Migration and Predation 
 Exclusion from formal economic sectors has had a tremendous impact on 
patterns of migration. Groups such as Los Zetas have targeted vulnerable populations, 
perpetrating violence and exploiting migrants through extortion and forced labor. 
Violence against migrants was not limited to Mexican citizens, however, and many of 
those who were targeted by Los Zetas came from Central America, where Cold War 
conflicts and liberalization left the scars of instability. In 2009, there were over 540,000 
undocumented immigrants apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol. While 90 percent of 
those apprehended were from Mexico, a significant percentage of those migrating North 
came from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.  
During a press conference in 2011, National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) 
President Raul Plascencia surprised the public after estimating that over 20,000 
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migrants had been kidnapped in Mexico in 2010.39 Considering undocumented peoples 
exist within exclusion zones of society, it is extremely difficult to substantiate such 
estimates. Regardless of the exact number, there was a consensus amongst 
government officials and non-governmental organizations that the potential danger to 
migrants was worsening. On January 13, 2011, the presidents of both Mexico and 
Guatemala declared TCOs presented the largest threat to migrant security. Additionally, 
the UN International Narcotics Control Board (JIFE) found that the consolidation of 
power by TCOs like Los Zetas had contributed to a new era of migration for Central 
Americans, and that TCOs were now the controlling force in migration. While migrants 
have long been vulnerable to exploitation by criminal groups, the period marked an 
intensification of predatory behaviors, such as kidnapping and sexual violence. 
Previously, there were more independent actors participating in the movement of 
migrants, but the highly organized structure, propensity for diversification, and extreme 
forms of coercion forced out independent actors, allowing the group to monopolize the 
industry.  
 A January 2011 U.S. Embassy cable details the intensifying dangers facing 
migrants on their journey north, arguing the massacres of migrants highlights the 
extensive TCO control over migration routes. Migrants often follow the routes of freight 
trains north, either by riding the train or by walking along the tracks, creating a focused 
space for TCOs to target those seeking safety and opportunity in the United States. 
Testimonies indicate TCO members often approach migrants to offer assistance 
reaching the border or appear to offer humanitarian aid, such as food, water, and 
 




shelter. Once under the control of TCO agents, migrants are transported to safe houses 
where they are “frequently beaten, poorly fed, and suffer numerous abuses.”40 After 
coercing migrants to provide phone numbers of relatives, they are forcibly held until 
family members pay for their release (if they are able). CNDH estimates that, on 
average, migrants were charged a $2,500 ransom. Considering the CNDH report covers 
a period of six months, this translates to $25 million dollars within a short timeframe.  
 Once held in a safe house, it was difficult to leave without paying the TCO. 
Migrants were often tortured and sometimes killed, as was the case in Tamaulipas.  
Still others were used as coerced labor to pay their “debt.” The fate of women who fell 
under the control of Los Zetas was different and often resulted in rape and sexual 
exploitation. A 2010 Amnesty International report indicated that 6 out of 10 migrant 
women experienced sexual violence during their journey.41 According to the same 
report, smugglers sometimes required women to get contraceptive injections so they did 
not become pregnant from rape during the journey. Violence is not necessarily the 
direct result of poverty but the result of sustained segregation in concentrated spaces.42 
It is through these exclusionary spaces that social fractures naturally occur. If under the 
neoliberal system, markets and the aspiration for upward mobility replaces both the 
state and community as the framework through which society is viewed, a process of 
neoliberal internalization occurs. Traditional familial and social connections become 
unmoored from their foundations and disconnected from their meaning. There is thus a 
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disintegration of previously held standards and the process of capital accumulation 
assumes control of all systems. 
In the case of Los Zetas, who are unmoored from traditional patterns of behavior, 
the focus should in part center on their role in global patterns of division and 
accumulation. Journalist and sociologist Dawn Paley argues we should think beyond 
neoliberalism in strictly economic terms and think of post-Cold War conflicts in Latin 
America, what she terms drug war capitalism, as a crucial part of the neoliberal war. 
Similar to Wendy Brown’s contention that neoliberalism infiltrates all societal systems, 
Paley argues the division and terror wrought through neoliberalism is dispersed 
throughout the population. The disappearances are crucial to neoliberalism and 
therefore to the expansion of capitalism.43  
During the Cold War in Latin America, militants and activists who sought societal 
change were disappeared. Post-Cold War conflicts, Paley argues, move beyond the 
sphere of activism and societal change, targeting the population more broadly. 
Specifically, young men regardless of political affiliation now account for most 
disappearances and are targeted because of their physical geography.44 According to 
the Registro Nacional de Datos de Personas Extraviados o Desaparecidos (RNPED), a 
registry for the disappeared, 50 percent of reported disappearances occurred in only 28 
municipalities (there a total of 2,547 municipalities in Mexico) and 30 percent of those 
reported occurred in either Guerrero or Tamaulipas. Additionally, the locations of the 
targets are inextricably connected to racial and socioeconomic demarcations and 
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globalization, as many of the disappearances take place along the U.S. border and 
along state-run highways, for which there is no toll. With each of these contexts in mind, 
the violence can therefore be viewed as directed at specific populations.  
The rhetoric in state documentation and within the media often frames the 
violence as related to the actions of the victims. A communication from the American 
Embassy in El Salvador in 2010, after the death of the 72 migrants in Tamaulipas, 
frames the violence as a natural result of “illegal” migration, implicitly assigning blame to 
the migrant community. The communication also highlights a cultural propensity in El 
Salvador, arguing the population doesn’t view themselves as engaged in illegality. 
“Migration to the United States is a unifying factor in Salvadoran society, and is not 
regarded by most as illegal, even when it is illegal.”45 The document implies it is the 
dangers of illegal migration that should be the focus of popular discourse, not the failure 
of the state to protect migrants.  
El Salvadorans had an alternate viewpoint and put the massacre on the front 
page of every major newspaper. As the number of Salvadoran victims rose, papers 
significantly increased their coverage, with certain papers publishing ten articles in one 
day.46 The focus of editorials was on criminality and the “GOM’s inability to provide 
security and justice,”47 as opposed to misguided victim-blaming. One leftist newspaper 
in El Salvador even had the audacity to blame U.S. immigration policy for the tragic 
events. Both the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) were united in their horror of Tamaulipas, focusing 
 
45 U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, Tamaulipas Massacre Seizes Front Page in El Salvador, 
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on the migrants’ hope for a better life as the primary motivation for migration. The U.S. 
Embassy, on the other hand, decried the failure of Salvadoran officials and 
policymakers to “underscore the dangers of illegal immigration,”48 considering they had 
an opportunity to do so in multiple interviews. This failure was, in the words of the U.S. 
Embassy, “ironic given the state of security in El Salvador.”49 The outrage against the 
GOM’s failure to protect migrants, as well as popular sentiments that thought U.S. policy 
contributed to insecurity in the region, challenged U.S. discourse that sought to shift the 
focus toward migrant negligence rather than regional insecurity.  
4.6 Social Division 
Los Zetas’ violent campaign in Tamaulipas was an efficient method for 
comprehensively infiltrating social space, sowing division and terror near San Fernando 
and beyond.  In 2011, after the string of kidnappings in San Fernando, an anonymously 
written and unconfirmed article50 was posted in the blog Borderland Beat. Written in 
narrative form, the piece recounts a bus hijacking in Tamaulipas, detailing how Los 
Zetas forced kidnapped men to fight to the death. According to the story, they were 
paired up, given sledgehammers, and told if they survived the fight they would be 
allowed to live and join the organization. The complete veracity of the dramatized story 
remains questionable; however an anonymous witness did speak with the Houston 
Chronicle, substantiating claims that Los Zetas forced kidnapped victims to fight in 
 
48 U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, Tamaulipas Massacre El Salvador. 
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gladiatorial style combat.51 Regardless of whether the witness was truthful, the 
gruesome accounting highlights the impact the violence in San Fernando had on 
popular consciousness, resulting in altered states of community.52  
The impact is not necessarily found in the article itself but is revealed in the 
public comment section, where people freely voice anger, repulsion, and opposition to 
the kidnappings. Most users are anonymous, and while members of TCOs likely post to 
blogs to spread disinformation and propaganda, a pattern nevertheless emerges that 
highlights the social fragmentation that occurs throughout Latin America as a result of 
escalating violence. While many users openly question whether the story is “true,” 
others don’t care if every detail is accurate, declaring the story itself is rooted in truth, 
and reflects deeper trends throughout the region. One user recounts their experience, 
writing, “i wish all you people behind this key boards would stop trying to figure out if it’s 
fake or real and come live a bit of what we live here in mexico…people it’s real i see it 
everyday ther’s so much we can’t tell because of fear over here but it’s happening.”53 In 
another comment, a user discloses their experience in Tamaulipas: “i used to visit my 
family in tamaulipas not anymore is so sad what is happening down there no one dares 
to come at night after 6 or 7 pm only them run the streets.”54 These silent zones are a 
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potent form of social division, in which people no longer gather in bars, have festivals, or 
indeed interact as they did previously.  
While the public does find a way to break through enforced silences, they are 
nevertheless relegated to more informal formats, such as blogs. In another post, a user 
from Brazil reflects upon 4 Brazilian victims who died at the “hands of these 
monsters.”55 The commenter does not seem to be directly affected by Los Zetas, but 
they are nevertheless psychologically affected by the acts, calling for the extermination 
of the group. It is in this way that the blog reflects both the connectivity of the format, in 
which the global public can interact in real-time, and the ways in which such connectivity 
can facilitate dramatic changes in the mindset of community members. The assaults on 
the mind can therefore reach spaces, in effect altering communities, that would 
otherwise be out of reach.  
Blogs such as Borderland Beat offer a unique opportunity to view the mindset of 
those affected by Los Zetas. It also illustrates the extent to which TCOs offer the 
“maintenance of extreme inequality,”56 relegating marginalized communities to atomized 
zones. The increasing socioeconomic exclusion coupled with social division provides an 
effective means to prevent forms of solidarity. There is no direct evidence of collusion 
between TCOs and private industry, but there is a consistent alignment of interests 
between the two groups, with transnational corporations emerging as the main 
benefactors of violence.57 The fear and instability in Tamaulipas caused the 
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displacement of residents, creating ghost towns,58 empty space devoid of populations 
who had previously called the region home. In effect, the displacement erased the 
social structures and community that had been in place prior to the occupation of Los 
Zetas. The emptiness in Tamaulipas, which resulted in diminishing land values, then 
provided an opportunity for private investors to develop the region so rich in resources. 
It is in this way that violence in the region extends to multiple domains within society, 
changing the movement through which the public interacted.  
Stiglitz argues globalization provided increased connectivity that reduced 
alienation and allowed people from varying backgrounds to have access to information 
and resources, but that developing countries were largely excluded from the economic 
benefits of globalization. While connectivity could be a positive force of change, it 
simultaneously provided an opportunity for elites to transform social meanings within all 
aspects of life. After neoliberalism was internalized and had replaced socioeconomic 
systems, those living outside the formal zone of society were forced to access the 
liberal zone by interacting with criminal groups or by existing within the nether regions of 
society. It therefore becomes more and more difficult to create private spaces of 
meaning according to individual and community needs and values. The alignment 
between TCOs and transnational corporations can therefore be viewed as rooted in the 
agency of the neoliberal frameworks themselves. In short, globalization has made Los 
Zetas, transnational corporations, and government systems agents of the neoliberal 
mandate. This is not to argue that private capital does not view instability as an 
opportunity or that corporations do not benefit from the violence but that the systems 
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Los Zetas transformed the landscape of criminality in Mexico, but the 
group is far from an anomaly. By moving past Los Zetas’ sadism and spectacular 
use of violence, it is possible to view how the organization is rooted within 
historical patterns in not only Mexico but the U.S. as well, existing in a space of 
transnational fluidity. Los Zetas, whose original members were trained at Fort 
Benning, GA, are an American invention as well as a Mexican one. The evolution 
of Z-40 is as much the product of Dallas, Texas, as Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.  
This project builds upon the work of Professor Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera who 
argues Los Zetas radically transformed criminal organizations throughout 
Mexico, and scholar Dawn Paley who views TCO conflicts in connection to a 
neoliberal war, by reframing Los Zetas’ evolution within historical processes like 
militarization, democratization, and neoliberalism. Such processes are not static 
and monolithic but are reliant on each other to develop and progress. This 
reorientation creates a more holistic perspective that recalls the historical 
continuity through which the Los Zetas emerged and importantly rejects 
essentialist rhetoric.  
The study of Los Zetas transcends their unique use of radio technology or 
their diversification of operations. It moves beyond their professionalization of 
violence that spread throughout Mexico. It even transcends their place within the 
post-Cold War paradigm. To study Los Zetas, is also to study the migrants, 
journalists, mayors, and townspeople who played an instrumental role in the 
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organization’s demise. It is through their perspectives that the power of activism 
and sacrifice becomes apparent. While the victims of Los Zetas are often viewed 
within a framework of powerlessness, this work reorients such unidirectional 
narratives. By examining a robust culture of opposition, rooted in the evolution of 
the criminal justice system, resistance in Guerrero, and the process of 
democratization, it becomes possible to understand how “victims” are not simply 
the objects of Los Zetas’ indiscriminate violence but a force of change.  
 This study moves beyond even Los Zetas and their opposition, however, 
by looking at the post-Cold War infrastructure of power—that of neoliberalism. It 
is through this lens that Los Zetas can be viewed as a force of instability, creating 
a space through which elite hegemony could thrive. Soldiers of the neoliberal 
project, Los Zetas created ghost towns where communities once thrived. They 
infiltrated and challenged state spaces, compromising police forces, and 
murdering agents of the state. They instilled terror in their zones of operation, 
dispossessing people not only of their lands but of the moments that forge 
solidarity—dances, weddings, funerals.  
 The model of Los Zetas, therefore, while different from the Cold-War 
model of violence, is unquestionably connected to the political. In 2020, by the 
November count, 32,759 people had been murdered in Mexico.1 On January 22, 
2021, nineteen migrants, three Mexican and sixteen Guatemalan, were executed 
by police forces in Tamaulipas, their burned bodies left in a pickup truck 
 
1 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Order From Chaos: Crime and Anti-Crime Security Policy in 





approximately forty miles from the U.S. border.2 There is an alternate vision of 
Tamaulipas, however, one that includes the March 2021 Inter-American 
Petroleum Technology Exhibition. Jalil Alva Monterrubio, director of the 
exhibition, stated the objective of the event was to develop projects such as 
deep-sea explorations: “We are inviting foreign investors to come and see what 
we are doing in Tamaulipas; to be able to generate investment from the oil sector 
within the state.”3 While globalization has increased growth and connectivity for 
certain sectors, its legacy of division, forming spaces of informality, illegality, and 
structural violence, cannot be denied. For those looking to better understand the 
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